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THE LOST HISTORY OF DELEGATION AT
THE FOUNDING
ChristineKexel Chabot*
The new Supreme Court is poised to bring the
administrative state to a grinding halt. Five Justices have
endorsed Justice Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy v. United
States-an opinion that threatens to invalidate countless
regulatorystatutes in which Congress has delegated significant
policymaking authority to the Executive Branch. Justice
Gorsuch claimed that the "text and history" of the Constitution
required the Court to replace a longstanding constitutional
doctrine that permits broad delegations with a more restrictive
one. But the supposedly originalist arguments advanced by
Justice Gorsuch and like-minded scholars run counter to the
understandings of delegation that prevailed in the Founding
Era. This Article brings to light previously overlooked
historical evidence of debates over the constitutionality of
delegation in the First Congress, as well as an in-depth
analysis of important policy decisions that the First Congress
subsequently delegated to the Executive Branch. It shows that
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and the First Congress
all approved of legislation that delegated some of our nation's
most consequentialpolicy decisions to the Executive Branch.
Delegation was the First Congress's solution to what was
arguably the greatest problem facing our fledgling Republic: a
potentially insurmountablenationaldebt. Alexander Hamilton
proposed a debt restructuring plan that would delegate
Congress's Article I, Section 8 power to "borrow Money," and
James Madison and other members of the First Congress
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debated this delegation before concluding that it was
constitutional. The resulting legislation delegated decisions
regarding borrowing and payment policies of the utmost
importance to the national economy to President Washington
and executive officers serving on the Sinking Fund
Commission. Delegation was also the First Congress's solution
to a protracted dispute over national patent rights to
revolutionary steam power technology. Although the
Intellectual Property Clause empowered Congress to resolve
inventors' competing petitions for exclusive patent rights, the

First Congress declined to do so and instead passed a barebones patent act that required executive officers to determine
fundamental legal parameters for grantingpatents. The first
U.S. debt and patent laws implicated some of the most
significant policy questions facing our nation, and Hamilton,
Madison, and the First Congress never understood the
Constitution to prohibit Congress from delegating these
questions. The doctrine recognized in the Founding Era
provides no reason for the Court to overhaul Congress's
constitutionallyprescribedrole or set aside over eighty years of
precedent.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States Congress delegates a wealth of policy
decisions to the Executive Branch. Justice Gorsuch's dissent in
Gundy v. United States asserts that this practice is
unconstitutional, and his opinion casts doubt on countless
regulatory statutes that delegate power to make "policy judgments"
to executive officers. 1 In Justice Gorsuch's view, such delegations
unconstitutionally transfer an exclusively legislative power and
exceed the prescribed executive role of finding "facts" and filling up
the "details." 2 He appears to have at least five votes to jettison the
precedent condoning such broad delegations, 3 and he claims that
this doctrinal leap is justified by originalism and fidelity to
separation of powers principles enshrined in the Constitution over
200 years ago. 4 But as this Article demonstrates, it is Justice
Gorsuch's argument, and not current doctrine, that is "at war" with
the "text and history" of the Constitution. 5
1Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.
& Thomas, J., dissenting). According to Justice Gorsuch's dissent, the "Constitution
demands" that "Congress, and not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgments"
required by regulatory statutes. Id.
2Id. at 2145.
3Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) (indicating willingness to "reconsider" the nondelegation
doctrine in a future case); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (statement of
Kavanaugh, J. respecting the denial of certiorari) (indicating support for a more rigorous
nondelegation doctrine). The recent addition of another originalist, Justice Amy Coney
Barrett, may yield yet another vote in favor of Justice Gorsuch's position. Amy Coney Barrett
Confirmed to US Supreme Court, BBC (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us2020-54700307.
4 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution promises that only
the people's elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty."); see also
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE

THROUGH DELEGATION 31 (1993) ("[E]arly legislative practice seemed to accord with the
theory of the Constitution"-or "nondelegation doctrine"-holding "that Congress rather than
administrators

shall make

the

law.");

PHILIP HAMBURGER,

IS

ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

UNLAWFUL? 109 (2014) (asserting that Congress did not "systematically authorize[] the
executive . . . to exercise lawmaking will" until the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
5 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch's historical claims do
not account for the materials presented in this Article, see id. at 2140 nn.61-62, and leading
works cited by Justice Gorsuch emphasize structural arguments to the detriment of
Founding-era history. See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV
710, 713 (1994) (reviewing SCHOENBROD, supra note 4) (arguing that Schoenbrod's arguments
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While previous debates over delegation traded only a few
"scraps" of historical evidence, 6 Justice Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy
has inspired invaluable surveys of delegations in the Founding Era.
These surveys reach different conclusions regarding Justice
Gorsuch's proposed ban on delegations of "policy judgments," 7 which
ostensibly encompass any binding "governmental act involving

political discretion"8 and exceed the Executive's circumscribed duty
"to make factual findings." 9 Recent scholarship has undermined
originalist claims that the Constitution bars delegations involving
only certain types of policy judgments: early legislation did not
reflect a categorical ban on delegations of power to impose "coercive
regulation of private rights and private conduct" any more than it
reflected a ban on delegation of power over public rights.10 But this

possess "neither textual nor historical warrant"); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002) ("Enactments of early Congresses are particularly
suspect [evidence of original meaning.]"); see also Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEx. L. REV. 1547,
1551 (2015) (reviewing HAMBURGER, supra note 4) (arguing that Hamburger's analysis ought
to "spend far more time on the ordinary meaning of the text as of 1789").
6 Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's Death
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1326 (2003) ("[We] have not systematically
canvassed [Founding-era delegations.]"); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1732 (2002) ("We aren't aware of any
comprehensive professional treatment of the history of the nondelegation doctrine ...
");
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) ("[T]he practice
of early congresses strongly suggests that broad grants of authority to the executive were not
thought to be problematic."). Other leading historical studies written before Gundy include
the following: JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34 (2012) (surveying Founding-era

statutes establishing administrative agencies); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to
Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 719-20 (1969) (addressing select Founding-era statutes);
Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective NondelegationDoctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New
Approach to the NondelegationDoctrine and Its Implicationsfor Clinton v. City of New York,
76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 317-18, 365 n.341 (2001) (discussing Founding-era legislation on
appropriations and borrowing); HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 100-10, 198-201 (discussing
concerns presented by early extraterritorial licensing regulations, presidential
determinations regarding foreign nations, and patent laws).
7 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
8 Krent, supra note 5, at 713 n.14.
9 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137, 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (recognizing a greater executive
role in foreign affairs and other areas ostensibly committed to the President under Article II).
10 Nicholas
R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against
Administrative RegulatoryPower: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on PrivateReal Estate
in the 1790s, 130 YALE L.J. 1288, 1301-13 (2021) (analyzing delegation of "rulemaking power
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work leaves open other questions about the contours of an
originalist nondelegation doctrine. Some scholars claim that there
were no limits on any of the substantive powers that Congress could
delegate to the Executive Branch,1 1 while other scholars contend
that early Congresses sometimes delegated power to make policy
judgments, just not important ones. 12 The latter scholars provide
continued reasons for the Court to abandon governing precedent
and the longstanding requirement that power delegated to the
Executive Branch be limited by an "intelligible principle."1 3
This Article brings to light previously overlooked constitutional
debates over delegation in the First Congress, as well as an in-depth
analysis of important domestic policy decisions that Congress
delegated to officers and agencies in the Executive Branch.1 4 This
under the 'direct tax' of 1798"); Kevin Arlyck, Delegation, Administration, andImprovisation,
97
NOTRE
DAME
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
6-8),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2366/ (examining how the Remission Act of
1790 delegated broad discretion to adjust statutory penalties imposed on private persons who
violated customs laws). But see Michael B. Rappaport, A Two Tiered and Categorical
Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine, AM. ENTER. INST. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3710048 ("[T]he Constitution imposes a
strict prohibition on" "rules that regulate citizens as to their private rights in the domestic
sphere."); Jennifer Mascott, Early Customs Laws and Delegation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1388, 1391 (2019) (examining early customs laws in which Congress generated "the rules and
policies imposing new limitations . . . on private actors"); Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 722 (2019) (arguing that "the Nondelegation Doctrine has a firm
foundation in the Constitution's original meaning"); cf. Philip Hamburger, Delegating or
Divesting? 115 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 106 (2020) ("[T]he Executive in the early years of
the Republic did not make binding rules or adjudications.").
11 Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L.
REV. 277, 280 (2021) ("[T]he Constitution at the Founding contained no discernable, legalized
prohibition on delegations of legislative power. . . "); accord Posner & Vermeule, supra note
6, at 1723 ("[A] statutory grant of authority to the Executive Branch or other agents can never
amount to a delegation of legislative power.").
12 Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE L.J. 1490, 1497 (2021) (favoring
an "important subjects" theory of nondelegation); see also Gary Lawson, Mr. Gorsuch, Meet
Mr. Marshall: A Private-Law Framework for the Public-Law Puzzle of Subdelegation, AM.
ENTER.
INST.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
8),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3607159
(proposing "a distinction
between 'important subjects' and matters of 'less interest' . . . as a test for identifying
unconstitutional legislative subdelegations").
13 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
14 These regulatory functions are still executed by administrative agencies today. See
Christine Kexel Chabot, Is the FederalReserve Constitutional?An OriginalistArgument for
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evidence establishes that the theory and practice of delegation in
the Founding Era never reflected a particularly high constitutional
bar. Early Congresses routinely delegated important policy
decisions that required executive officers to go far beyond finding
facts and filling up details. 15 The limits early Congresses recognized
for delegation were not exacting and generally required Congress to
"establish the principle" 16 (perhaps intelligibly) governing execution
of the law. 17 The restrained nondelegation doctrine identified by this
Article does not support a significant shift to a requirement that
Congress decide all important policy questions.
The First Congress considered and passed laws that delegated
powers implicating two of the greatest challenges facing the nation:
first, the need to provide a cost-effective means of repaying a
potentially insurmountable debt; and second, the need to promote
inventions that would facilitate industrialization. 18 The express
language of the Constitution designates these powers as
"legislative" powers vested in Congress. In particular, Article I,
Section 8 authorizes Congress to "pay the Debts," "borrow Money,"
and "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 19

Congress debated the constitutionality of delegating its Article I,
Section 8 powers during its initial efforts to establish the machinery
of the new government. When confronting the pressing matter of
Independent Agencies, 96 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 47-52 (2020) (describing open market
purchases implemented by the Sinking Fund Commission and today's Federal Reserve);
Patent Basics, U.S.

PAT.

& TRADEMARK

OFF.,

https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-

started/general-information-concerning-patents#heading-1 (last modified July 1, 2021, 4:56
PM) (noting the USPTO's role in examining and granting patents).
15 See infra Part III.
16 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). The Annals of Congress
were not compiled until 1834 and "did not include all previously published debates." Marion
Tinling, Thomas Lloyd's Reports of the FirstFederal Congress, 18 WM. & MARY Q. 519, 520
(1961). The first two volumes of the Annals of Congress were also published in two separate
editions with different pagination. Id. at 520 n.2. References in this Article refer to the edition
with the running head "History of Congress."
17 Though a "necessity" argument raised by James Madison supported more exacting
requirements in one instance, 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238-39 (1791), this argument does not
support a broader ban on delegations of important policy questions. See infra Parts IV-V.
18 See infra Part III.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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U.S. debt, Congress sought advice from the Secretary of the
Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. He proposed legislation that would
delegate power to repay the debt and borrow money.2 0 Despite
constitutional objections to this delegation, James Madison and
other members of the First Congress empowered President
Washington to borrow up to $14 million to refinance, purchase, and
cover interest payments on U.S. debt. 2 1 For 1790 this was an
immense sum of money-on the scale of the $15 million that the
United States would spend to double its size in the Louisiana
Purchase. 22 In today's terms, this delegation would authorize the
President to borrow over $1 trillion. 23
It is no surprise that Madison referred to the borrowing law as a
delegation of "great trust" that left key terms of loans and
"execution of one of the most important laws" to the President. 24
Subsequent Congresses continued to award the President vast
borrowing power and twice allowed him to borrow millions of dollars
for "public purposes." 25 The First Congress also created the Sinking
20

ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT RELATIVE TO A PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC

CREDIT (1790), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-02-0076-0002-0001.
Unless otherwise noted, the historical papers cited in this study are drawn from the Founders
Online collection compiled by the National Archive's National Historical Publications and
Records Commission, available at https://founders.archives.gov/about [hereinafter FOUNDERS
ONLINE].
21 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139 (authorizing the President to borrow
sums "not exceeding in the whole twelve million of dollars"); Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 4,
1 Stat. 186, 187 (authorizing the President to borrow sums "not exceeding in the whole two
millions of dollars"); see Lloyd's Notes, 19 May 1790, Debates in the House of Representatives,
in XIII DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1351 (Helen E. Veit, Charlene Bangs Bickford, Kenneth R. Bowling & William
Charles diGiacomantonio eds., 1994) [hereinafter Lloyd's Notes] (reporting constitutional

debates over delegation of borrowing power); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS 73 n.143 (1997) (noting constitutional objections to delegation of borrowing power).

Thomas Lloyd was "the favored reporter" who took shorthand notes on the debates in the
House of Representatives. Tinling, supra note 16 at 519, 521.
22 The
Louisiana Purchase,
MONTICELLO,
https://www.monticello.org/thomasjefferson/louisiana-lewis-clark/the-louisiana-purchase (last visited Oct. 14, 2021) (listing the
price of the Louisiana Purchase as $15 million).
23 See infra note 248.
24 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1354 (parentheses omitted).
25 Act of Mar. 20, 1794, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 345 (obsolete) (authorizing the President to borrow up
to $1 million); Act of Dec. 18, 1794, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 404 (expired) (authorizing a loan of up to $2
million "to be applied to such public purposes, as are authorized by law").

90

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:81

Fund Commission, which was Alexander Hamilton's brainchild for
supporting U.S. credit through open market purchases of debt held
in the form of U.S. securities. 26 This legislation required executive
officers, including Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and
other Commissioners, to determine the terms and amount of open
market purchases that would bolster the value of U.S. securities
while repaying the national debt. 27 The United States' future credit
and financial viability hinged on the policy decisions delegated to
the Executive Branch in the borrowing and sinking fund legislation.
Debt legislation was not the only time that Congress delegated
power to resolve important policy questions. Multiple inventors

seeking exclusive rights to their discoveries petitioned Congress for
patents, including those who battled over national patents for
steamboat technology that was thought to reflect the start of "the
automotive

age." 28 In response,

Congress departed from state

legislatures' earlier practice of issuing patents through private
laws. 29 In the Patent Act of 1790, Congress delegated its Article I,
Section 8 power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"
to a Patent Board comprised of Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson,
Attorney General Edmund Randolph, and Secretary of War Henry
Knox.30 The Board could grant patents for any "sufficiently useful
and important" inventions or discoveries,3 1 and no "yard stick was
handed to these officers by Congress other than [this] undefined
concept." 32 The First Congress knowingly left the Board to establish
fundamental legal parameters for granting patents.
This Article assesses the historical record on delegation as
follows: Part II provides an overview of the nondelegation doctrine
and the constitutional limits on Congress's ability to delegate its
powers under Article I of the Constitution. Part III unearths
See HAMILTON, supra note 20 (proposing the Sinking Fund Commission).
See Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, §4, 1 Stat. 186, 187.
28 Frank D. Prager, The Steamboat PioneersBefore the Founding Fathers,37 J. PAT. OFF.
SOc'Y 486, 486 (1955).
29 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, 58 ARIz. L.
REV. 263, 267-68 (2016) (discussing early practices for issuing patents).
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed
1793).
31 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
32 Frank D. Prager, Proposalsfor the PatentAct of 1790, 36 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 157, 165
(1954).
26

27
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previously overlooked historical evidence surrounding the First
Congress's delegations of power to the President and the executive
officers who comprised the Patent Board and Sinking Fund
Commission. The nondelegation doctrine recognized by the First
Congress permitted delegation of some of our nation's most
important policy questions to the Executive Branch. In Part IV, this
Article reconciles the First Congress's broad delegations with the
Second Congress's refusal to delegate power to establish post roads.
In Parts V and VI, this Article concludes that fidelity to precedent
and the historical record requires the Court to stand by the
intelligible principle requirement.

When balancing constitutional objections against pressing needs
to effectuate key legislative powers on repayment of debt and
borrowing, Hamilton, Madison, and the First Congress all chose
delegation. The First Congress handed off some of the Founding
Era's most important questions on debt and intellectual property
rights to executive officers. 33 Even Thomas Jefferson never raised a
constitutional objection to the powers delegated to him, despite his
apparent dislike for both the financial policies effectuated by the
Sinking Fund Commission and the heavy workload imposed on him
by the Patent Board. 34 None of these original originalists
understood the Constitution to require that Congress resolve all
important policy questions in legislation. If the Supreme Court
requires Congress to take on this role now, the Court will create a
brand new constitutional requirement that was never imagined by
the Constitution's Framers.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. LEGISLATIVE POWERS (WHAT ARTICLE I SAYS AND LEAVES
UNSAID)

The nondelegation doctrine reflects a fundamental maxim of
separation of powers. John Locke defined legislative power as a
nontransferable "delegated power from the people" and a sovereign
authority that permits the legislature "only to make laws, and not
33 See infra Part III.
34 See infra Sections III.A.4, III.B.2.
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to make legislators." 35 Legislative delegations themselves reflect a
rich background of legal traditions and political theories developed
outside of the United States.36 Toward the end of the eighteenth
century, however, even a Framer who had read every treatise on the
shelf would still have many questions about delegation of legislative
powers under the United States' new Constitution.
The problem of defining legislative power perplexed James
Madison from the start. As a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Madison brought "a strong bias in favor of an
enumeration and definition of powers necessary to be exercised by
the national Legislature." 37 At the same time, Madison harbored
"doubts concerning [the] practicability" of this undertaking. 38 At one
point, he even became "convinced" that a definition "of the limits
and powers of the federal Legislature .

.

. could not be done."3 9

Early debates at the Constitutional Convention did not involve
precise definitions. They nevertheless focused on concepts
important to delegation, and Madison in particular worried about
an unduly limited executive role. He moved for an amendment
clarifying that the Executive has the power not only to "carry into
effect[] the national laws" but also "to execute such other powers ...
as may from time to time be delegated by the national
Legislature." 40 Madison also agreed to specify in his amendment
that these "other" delegated powers not be "improper"-that is, the
powers must not be "Legislative [or] Judiciary in their nature."4 1
The delegates ultimately rejected Madison's amendment as
"unnecessary" based on the understanding that its "object" (i.e.,

35 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 100 (Andrew Bailey ed.,
2015).
36 See, e.g., Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 293-313 (discussing views held by the
most influential contemporary political theorists of the Framer's era" and delegation practice
in England); Hamburger, supra note 10, at 96-101 (contesting assertions of "a monolithic
European view on delegation").

37

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 53 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)

[hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS].
38 Id.

39 d

t 60.

40 Id. at 67; see also MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD NOT BE KING:
EXECUTIVE POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 328-29 (2020) (noting that "other powers" to

which Madison referred may have been prerogative Crown powers such as borrowing money).
41 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 37, at 67.
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delegation of "other powers") was already "included in the 'power to
carry into effect the national laws."' 42 The delegates said nothing
about removal of accompanying language that limited "improper"
delegations of powers that were legislative or judicial in nature. 43
The Constitution that emerged from the Convention left open
many questions about the relationship between legislative and
executive powers. In The Federalist, Madison recognized continued
challenges of distinguishing legislative powers from other powers of
government: "[N]o skill in the science of government has yet been
able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary ... "44
This difficulty did not eliminate the need to address separation of
powers concerns, however, as Madison recognized objections that
"[t]here can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers
are united in the same person." 45 For Madison, this separation of
powers concern did not prevent the legislative and executive
departments from possessing "partialagency in ... the acts of each
other." 46 Separation of powers instead required that "the whole
power of one department" not be "exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department." 47 According
to Madison, the Constitution met this requirement: "The magistrate
in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make
a law, though he can put a negative on every law .... "48 In other
words, Article I, Section 7 prevented the President from making law
on his own.

This understanding of Section 7's lawmaking procedures left
unresolved questions about Congress's ability to enlist the
Executive Branch in carrying out sovereign powers vested in

Congress. Article I, Section 1 vests "[a]ll legislative Powers herein

42 Id.

43 Id.
44

THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 224 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

45

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 44, at 299 (James Madison) (quoting Montesquieu).

46

d.
Id. Madison later expressed a similar concern that "a general conveyance of authority,

47

without laying down any precise rules" might allow the "whole power of legislation" to be
"transferred by the legislature from itself." JAMES MADISON, THE REPORT OF 1800 (1800),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0202.
48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 44, at 300 (James Madison).
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granted" in Congress,49 and Article I, Section 7 specifies
bicameralism and presentment as procedures that Congress and the
President must follow in order to enact a law.5 0 Article I, Section 8
enumerates the substantive, sovereign powers vested in Congress.
These powers include the power to "lay and collect Taxes," to
"borrow money on the Credit of the United States," and to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations[] and among the several States,"
among others. 5 1 The final clause in Article I, Section 8 is the
Sweeping Clause. 52 This Clause anticipates law execution and
directs Congress to "make ...

Laws" (that is, to take official action

under Section 7) when it delegates Section 8 powers to the Executive
Branch.53 The Sweeping Clause does not empower Congress to
make "all Laws," period. Instead, it directs Congress to make "all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers" enumerated at the beginning of
Section 8.54
At the very least, the text of Article I requires Congress itself to
implement Article I, Section 7's procedures when passing laws. 55
Some scholars claim that voting on bills is one of the few nondelegable legislative powers under Article I and that delegation
concerns never extend to the amount of discretionary power that a
law gives to the Executive. 56 But this understanding may not give

adequate consideration to the sovereign powers vested in Congress
pursuant to Article I, Section 8. Consider the following hypothetical
statute: following procedures set forth in Article I, Section 7,
Congress passes a statute that copies verbatim the "foregoing"

49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
50U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

52 Id.
53 d.

64Id. The clause concludes, "and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." Id.
55 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-51 (1983) (holding that Congress cannot take
binding action outside of Article I, Section 7 procedures).
56 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1723 (arguing that Congress has unlimited power
to "grant . . . authority to the executive" so long as it does not "delegate to anyone else the
authority to vote on federal statutes"); accord Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 280
(same).
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legislative powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8.57 This statute
may include all clauses of Section 8, from "Power To lay and collect
Taxes" to power "To exercise exclusive Legislation" over the seat of
government, or it may include all of a particular sovereign power
such as the borrowing power or the power to establish post roads. 58
In either case, the statute would hand off a Section 8 power or
powers to the Executive Branch, wholesale.
Such a statute would delegate to the Executive the entirety of the
sovereign power or powers that Section 8 vested in Congress, but
without a constitutional amendment to formally alter Article I's
original allocation of powers. This arrangement would seem to
implicate Madison's concern about the "whole power of one
department" being "exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department." 59 Indeed, delegation of an
entire Section 8 power might amount to an alienation or
impermissible transfer of power in a way that delegation of part of
this power would not. Although, in theory, Congress could always
undo a delegation by passing another law, a legislature that has
handed off the entirety of a particular power may not be able to do
so. To undo any delegation, additional legislation would require
either the President's approval or a supermajority of Congress.6 0 A
President naturally may be less willing to cede power than she was
to accept it in the first place. In a case where the President already
possesses all Article I, Section 8 powers, then Congress may lack
the bargaining chips it would need: discretion to withhold or grant
additional powers in future legislation in order to convince the
President to cede existing power. The same dynamic would also
apply if the President possessed the whole of a particular power
under Section 8. Finally, delegation of the entirety of certain Section
8 powers, such as borrowing, might allow the President to exhaust
the United States' entire borrowing capacity for some time. As a
practical matter, this would leave no immediate borrowing power
for Congress to regain in subsequent legislation. These are all
7 Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1756 (discussing a hypothetical statute
delegating Section 7 power to vote on bills).
58 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 44, at 299 (James Madison).
60 See Hamburger, supra note 10, at 109 (stating that Congress "cannot always recall"
powers it transfers).
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reasons why a Congress that retains some portion of an Article I,
Section 8 power may be different than one that retains none of that
power.

The text of the Constitution does not address this concern
directly, but it does require laws that delegate Article I, Section 8
authority to be "necessary and proper." 6 1 Some originalists have
argued that a law must respect the Constitution's structural
commitments in order to be "proper." 62 The hypothetical statute
described above would arguably upset Section 8's allocation of
certain powers to Congress. While the hypothetical cession of Article
I, Section 8 powers may seem extreme, this possibility resonates
with concerns that members of early Congresses expressed in
debates over delegation. Representative Page raised this exact point
when debating delegation of power to establish post roads: "[I]f this
House can, with propriety, leave the business of the post office to
the President, it may leave to him any other business of
legislation. . . ."63 If this were the case, continued Page, he proposed
that Congress "adjourn and leave all the objects of legislation to [the
President's] sole consideration and direction." 64 Page suggested that
delegation of all legislative powers would be unconstitutional, 65 and
members of Congress expressed similar concerns about laws that
would delegate great amounts of the legislative powers to borrow
money and establish post roads under Article I, Section 8.66 Laws
delegating these powers to the Executive would seem to contradict
the Constitution's textual commitment of these powers to Congress.
The text of Article I does not provide a doctrinal test or specify
how much of a particular power may be delegated without creating
an "improper" transfer of legislative power. There is no ban on
delegating an entire Section 8 power or "important subjects" related
to such power. Nor is there a requirement that the delegation be
61 U.S. CONST. art 1,

§ 8.

62 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of Federal Power: A
JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 334 (1993) (arguing
that Congress "must respect" "'proper' principles of governmental structure" and avoid
"delegation of legislative power").
63 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 233-34 (1791) (statement of Rep. Page); Wurman, supra note 12, at
1507.
64 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 233 (1791) (statement of Rep. Page).
65 Id. at 233-34.
66 See infra Section III (introduction) & Section III.A.2.
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limited by an "intelligible principle." All of these potential
limitations on Congress's power to delegate are contingent on the
historical record and the limitations on delegation that were
recognized in the

Founding Era.

As Professors

Bagley

and

Mortenson aptly note, "nondelegation doctrine is not a logically
required implication of the bare constitutional text. History is thus
the linchpin of the originalist case." 67 The subsection below outlines
key delegation doctrines developed by courts and describes the legal
framework against which the historical record will be measured.
B. PRECEDENT: IMPORTANT SUBJECTS AND INTELLIGIBLE
PRINCIPLES

Courts have also struggled to identify the constitutional
boundaries of permissible delegation. On the rare occasions when
the Supreme Court reviewed Congress's early delegations, the
Court validated Congress's allocations of power to the Executive
and Judicial Branches. 68 In an important early decision in Wayman
v. Southard, Chief Justice Marshall considered whether a federal
statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it
authorized federal courts to make certain "alterations and
additions" to procedures for execution of judgment. 69 Chief Justice
Marshall explained that Congress cannot delegate "powers which
are strictly and exclusively legislative."7 0 In other cases, however,
legislative powers overlap with powers of other branches, and
"Congress may certainly delegate to others[] powers which the
legislature may rightfully exercise itself." 71 Echoing James
Madison, the Court noted the lack of a clear test to distinguish
"exclusively legislative" powers from powers that Congress could
delegate to other branches: "The line has not been exactly drawn
which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 291.
See, e.g., Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813)
(rejecting summarily a constitutional challenge to Congress's delegation of "discretion" to
revive certain trade restrictions).
69 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41 (1825) (quoting Process Act of 1792,
ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276).
70 Id. at 42-43.
71 Id. at 43.
67
68
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regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in
which a general provision may be made" for officers "to fill up the
details." 72 The Court declined to draw this line in Wayman. 73 It left
the question of exactly which "important subjects" must be specified
"within the great outlines marked out by the legislature"
unanswered. 74
The Supreme Court's early validations of federal legislation
began a virtually unbroken string of cases in which the Supreme
Court validated delegations in other statutes. In J. W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, Chief Justice Taft articulated an important
doctrinal test to distinguish impermissible delegations of
exclusively legislative powers from permissible delegations of
overlapping powers. 75 His test drew a line between permissible
delegations in which Congress established an "intelligible principle"
to guide execution of the law and impermissible delegations in
which the Executive operated without the benefit of such
guidance. 76 Writing for the Court, Taft held that the Tariff Act of
1922 did not afford "a forbidden delegation of legislative power" to
lay and collect taxes because Congress had established "an
intelligible principle" to which the President (then Calvin Coolidge)
was "directed to conform" when increasing certain tariffs on
imported goods. 77
Chief Justice Taft was no stranger to Founding-era history, and
his application of the intelligible principle test did not require
Congress to resolve all important policy questions. The Tariff Act
created a general "policy and plan" for tariffs to equalize differences
between the costs of producing goods in foreign countries and the
United States. 78 But when Congress delegated its power to "lay and

Id. at 42-43 (emphasis added).
7 See id. at 46 (explaining that "the precise boundary" of power that may be committed "to
the discretion of the other departments" is a "delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a Court
will not enter unnecessarily"); id. at 48-49 (noting that the certified question before the Court
omitted "the question respecting the right of the Courts to alter" procedures under the Process
Act).
74 Id. at 43, 45.
7 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
76 d
77 d.
78 Id. at 405.
72
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collect Taxes" under Article I, Section 8,7 Congress handed off the
critical and dynamic questions of determining differences in costs
and equalizing increases in tariffs to the President.8 0 Statutory
provisions for determination of differences in cost were not so
formulaic as to obviate policy decisions, 8 1 and the function of
determining these cost differences was such "a matter of great
importance" that Congress delegated it "by statute to the President"
himself.82 The Chief Justice also considered Congress's structural
disadvantages in resolving dynamic questions and acknowledged
the necessity of delegation that reflected "common sense and the
inherent necessities" of "governmental co-ordination." 8 3
In subsequent cases, the Court did not require Congress to
resolve all important policy questions and applied the intelligible
principle doctrine to validate broadly worded federal legislation.
The nondelegation doctrine had one consequential year in 1935,
when the Court held that two pieces of New Deal legislation failed
to provide an intelligible principle to guide executive discretion. 84
The Court has never since invalidated federal legislation on the
ground that it unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the
Executive Branch.

After many cases in which the intelligible principle requirement
failed to provide meaningful constraints, 85 however, some jurists

79 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
80
Hampton, 276 U.S. at 405.
81 The
President had discretion

to take into account "any other advantages or
disadvantages in competition" beyond specified costs of production such as wages and cost of
materials. Id. at 401-02 (quoting Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 315(c), 42 Stat. 858, 943,
repealed by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 651(a)(1), 46 Stat. 590, 762).
82 Id. at 405.
83 Id. at 405-06.
84 See Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) ("Congress has declared
no policy,
has established no standard, has laid down no rule."); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (holding that the President's "virtually unfettered"
power to establish codes of fair competition amounted to "an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power"); see also Sunstein, supra note 6, at 322 (noting these cases); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-11 (1936) (holding that a statute delegating "the power to
fix maximum hours of labor to a part of the" private "producers and ... miners" amounted to
"legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form" and was unconstitutional under
Schechter).
85 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944) (approving a delegation of
power to fix "fair and equitable" prices under the Emergency Price Control Act).
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began to question the breadth of delegation permitted by governing
doctrine. In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute (the Benzene case), the Court reviewed a health
standard that was promulgated under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act and severely limited employees' exposure to the toxic
chemical benzene. 86 The Act arguably afforded sweeping power to
eliminate health risks based on exposure to toxic materials, and the
Justices addressed whether the law amounted to an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Secretary of
Labor. 87 Then-Justice Rehnquist concurred in the decision to
remand the issue to the Secretary of Labor. 88 He argued that the
Act's requirement that exposure be safe "to the extent feasible"
amounted to an "uncanalized delegation[ of legislative power" and
that the Secretary should be limited to "setting a safe standard or
setting no standard at all" on remand. 89 According to Justice
Rehnquist, Congress failed to decide "whether the statistical
possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the
economic costs,"9 0 and the feasibility loophole in the Act gave the
Secretary "absolutely no indication where on the continuum of
relative safety he should draw his line."9 1
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Act failed to supply an
intelligible principle to guide the Secretary's regulation and did not
overtly challenge this doctrinal requirement. 92 At the same time,
Justice Rehnquist echoed Chief Justice Marshall's concerns in
Wayman when he focused on the "character" of the question
Congress failed to decide. 93 Justice Rehnquist noted that the
question of "whether the law of diminishing returns should have

86 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
87 Justice Stevens's plurality opinion interpreted the Act to require a finding of "significant
risk" and affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision to remand the matter to the Secretary for
further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. Id. at 646, 662.
88 Id. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 675, 681, 688.
90 Id. at 672.
91 Id. at 675.
92 Id. at 685-86.

93 Id. at 674 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928));
see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (considering "the character of
the power given to the Courts by the Process Act").
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any place in the regulation of toxic substances [was]
quintessentially one of legislative policy." 94 His analysis also
emphasized Congress's obligation to resolve important policy
questions and make "hard choices": "When fundamental policy
decisions underlying important legislation about to be enacted are
to be made, the buck stops with Congress .

. ..

"95

Justice Rehnquist's argument did not turn on importance alone.
He grounded his analysis in a long line of decisions in which courts
had approved statutes that merely laid "down the general policy and
standards that animate the law." 96 According to Rehnquist, these
approvals depended "largely on the theory" that delegation was
required because the field in which Congress chose to legislate was
"sufficiently technical," covered too much ground, and exceeded
Congress's limited expertise. 97 To his mind, these decisions reflected
Chief Justice Taft's understanding that "delegations of legislative
authority must be judged 'according to common sense and the
inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination."' 98 Rehnquist
determined that it was not necessary for Congress to delegate an
important question in the Occupational Safety and Health Act when
the legislative history established that Congress had "simply
avoid[ed] a choice" that it was "best suited" to make. 99 In other
words, because there was "no need for such an evasive standard as
'feasibility,"' the Act's broad delegation fell outside the "rule of
necessity" that might permit generous delegations in other cases.10 0
C. THE MANY FACES OF NONDELEGATION ORIGINALISM

One might have expected Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
Benzene to set the stage for originalists to raise separation of powers

94Benzene, 448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

at 687.
96 Id. at 675. Setting a "general policy" to "animate the law" is less demanding than Justice
Gorsuch's requirement that Congress "make the policy judgments" and "assign to the
executive only the responsibility to make factual findings." Compare id., with Gundy v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
97 Benzene, 448 U.S. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 674 (emphasis added) (quoting Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406).
99 Id. at 672, 687.
100 Id. at 684-85.
95Id.
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arguments in support of a more assertive nondelegation doctrine.
1 0 1 a 1983 decision in which the Supreme
After INS v. Chadha,
Court
"struck down the one-house legislative veto on separation of powers
grounds, litigators in the [Reagan] Justice Department" proffered

originalist arguments to support "similar separation of powers

challenges" in other cases before the Court.1 0 2 At the time, these
originalist arguments had limited success. In Morrison v. Olson, for
example, only Justice Scalia endorsed arguments that the original
meaning of Article II established a unitary executive with "exclusive
control over the exercise" of "executive power" by subordinate
officers.10 3
Originalist arguments for an enhanced nondelegation doctrine
failed to surface in leading Supreme Court opinions in the 1980s.
Justice Scalia, for one, did not advocate a new nondelegation test
(for most cases) in his dissent in Mistretta v. United States. 104
Instead, he opined that the "doctrine of unconstitutional
delegation .

.

. is not an element readily enforceable by the courts,"

as courts "have almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left
to those executing or applying the law."10 5

Justice Scalia also stuck with precedent and the intelligible
principle requirement in his 2001 decision in Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations.106 When writing the majority opinion, he
held that the Clean Air Act provisions authorizing the EPA to
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Amanda Hollis-Brusky, Helping Ideas Have Consequences: Political and Intellectual
Investment in the Unitary Executive Theory, 1981-2000, 89 DENy. U. L. REV. 197, 206-09
(2011) (footnote omitted) (noting originalist arguments for a unitary executive in Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
103 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 120102 (1992) (noting "Justice[] Scalia['s] theory of an absolute presidential power to remove at
will principal subordinate officers"); see also Chabot, supra note 14, at 17-19 (discussing
unitary executive arguments raised in the 1980s).
104 488 U.S. 361, 413-27 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 415-16; see also Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REGUL., July-Aug.
1980, at 25, 26-27 (discussing the Benzene decision); William K. Kelley, Justice Scalia, the
Nondelegation Doctrine, and ConstitutionalArgument, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2119
(2017) (noting that the "original meaning of the nondelegation doctrine" is "conspicuously
absent in Justice Scalia's nondelegation jurisprudence").
106 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
101

102
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promulgate air quality rules "'requisite' . . . to protect the public

health" passed constitutional muster.10 7 The EPA's broad
rulemaking authority did not amount to an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch.10 8 For
Justice Scalia, the presence of an intelligible principle (and not the
agency's apparent lawmaking function) demarcated whether
Congress unconstitutionally "delegated legislative power to the
agency."109 The intelligible principle requirement operated largely
as a rule of deference to Congress. It also avoided the discretionary
line drawing required by an important questions test, which seemed
important to Justice Scalia.110 As Gary Lawson put it, it is "no
surprise that a rule-of-law devotee like Justice Scalia" fled from the
important questions test "as a vampire flees garlic.""1

Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's initial willingness to
accommodate lax nondelegation standards, in more recent decades
originalists have begun to dispute the intelligible principle
requirement in earnest. In an apparent response to perceived

excesses of executive or bureaucratic power, conservative jurists
have railed against unchecked executive power with arguments
ranging from attacks on Chevron deference1 1 2 to calls for a
reinvigorated originalist understanding of the nondelegation
doctrine.1 13 At the same time, the Roberts Court has embraced
originalist arguments supporting the strong unitary executive

theory from Justice Scalia's 1988 dissent in Morrison.11 4 Perhaps

107

Id. at 475-76.

108 Id.

Id. at 472.
10 See Kelley, supra note 105, at 2118 ("Justice Scalia's approach to the nondelegation
doctrine fit naturally within his general aversion to arguments from degree.").
111 Lawson, supranote 5, at 361.
112 In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch approved of
'mounting criticism of Chevron deference." BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893, 908 (2019)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Gorsuch criticized Chevron for allowing the "federal government's
executive branch" to "dictate an inferior interpretation of the law that may be more the
product of politics than a scrupulous reading of the statute." Id. at 908-09.
113 See supra notes 10, 12 (listing originalist works supporting a stronger nondelegation
doctrine).
114 See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020)
("Under our Constitution, the 'executive Power'-all of it-is 'vested in a President' ...
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1)); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561
"

109

104
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ironically, these originalist arguments skew in favor of the
Executive Branch: they rest on a selective historical record 115 and
fail to account for recent scholarship bringing to light structural
limitations that Alexander Hamilton, the First Congress, and
George Washington adopted to constrain executive power in the
Founding Era. 116 The Founding Era's structural checks on executive

removal power offer a generally overlooked originalist alternative
to the substantive checks that proponents of a stronger
nondelegation doctrine call for today. But instead of considering this
alternative for reining in executive power, conventional originalist
arguments have focused on a stronger nondelegation doctrine. 117
The originalist shift to calls for a stronger nondelegation doctrine
surfaced in judicial opinions written by Justice Thomas in
Whitman v. American Trucking118 and then in Department of
Transportationv. Association of American Railroads.119 Now, in the
U.S. 477, 483 (2010) ("Since 1789, the Constitution has been understood to empower the
President to keep . .. officers accountable-by removing them from office, if necessary.").
115 Ganesh Sitaraman, The Political Economy of the Removal Power, 134 HARV. L. REV.
352, 386-87 (2020) ("[Justices may] cherry-pick[] evidence that supports a predetermined
policy position.").
116 Contrary to originalist orthodoxy, Alexander Hamilton, the First Congress, and George
Washington all agreed to check executive power through statutory provisions that limited the
President's removal power and dispersed key decisions amongst multiple actors. See Chabot,
supra note 14, at 37-43 (explaining how the First Congress established an "independent,"
"multimember" Sinking Fund Commission to check unlawful disbursements of funds by the
President); Christine Kexel Chabot, Interring the Unitary Executive 3 (Sept. 10, 2021)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3921776
(recounting how the First Congress passed dozens of independent regulatory structures in
order to check unlawful executive action); see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Presidential
Removal: The Marbury Problem and the Madison Solutions, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 2085, 2088
(2021) (summarizing recent research supporting the conclusion that Article II "did not 'vest'
exclusive removal power" in the President).
117 Justice Gorsuch, for example, rejected structural limits on removal as an "encroachment
on the power of the Executive" when he joined Justice Thomas's opinion in Seila Law, 140 S.
Ct. at 2212 (Thomas, J., concurring), while he urged a stronger nondelegation doctrine to
check the "proliferation of new executive programs" established by Congress in Gundy v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
118 See 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (inviting the Court to revisit
nondelegation "[o]n a future day" when "the significance of the delegated decision is simply
too great for the decision to be called anything other than 'legislative"').
119 See 575 U.S. 43, 76 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he core of the legislative power
that the Framers sought to protect from consolidation with the executive . . . [involves]
generally applicable rules of private conduct.").
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wake of Gundy, it is doubtful that the intelligible principle
requirement will continue to draw a majority of the Court. Although
five Justices validated the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act under the intelligible principle requirement in
Gundy, 120 two of these votes are up for grabs. Justice Ginsburg is no
longer on the Court and has been replaced by Justice Barrett.
Further, Justice Alito indicated that he would switch his vote if the
Court gained votes to overturn the intelligible principle
requirement in the future. 12 1 Justice Kavanaugh did not participate
in Gundy but later signaled a likely fifth vote for a stronger doctrine
in Paul v. United States.122 He urged a "nondelegation principle for
major questions," based on the understanding that important or
"major national policy decisions must be made by Congress and the
President in the legislative process." 123 These opinions suggest that
Justice Gorsuch will have the votes he needs to eliminate the
intelligible principle requirement in a future case.
It's less clear what the new test would be. Parts of Justice
Gorsuch's dissent in Gundy embraced a broad, formalist view of
non-delegable legislative powers. According to Gorsuch, Congress
must "announce[] the controlling general policy," set forth
"sufficiently definite and precise" standards by which courts and
others may ascertain compliance, and "prescribe[] the rule
governing private conduct." 124 The Executive's role would then be
limited to "fact-finding," except in cases where the statute involves
"foreign affairs" or other powers "constitutionally vested in the

120 Justice Kagan's opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
found that the Act contained an intelligible principle because it required, by implication, that
the Attorney General apply the Act's "registration requirements as soon as feasible to
offenders convicted before the statute's enactment." Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality
opinion). Justice Alito wrote separately to concur in the judgment, and Justice Kavanaugh
took no part in the case. Id. at 2130. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined
Justice Gorsuch in dissent. Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
121 See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring) ("If a majority of this Court were willing to
reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.").
122 See 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (statement of Kavanaugh, J. respecting the denial of
certiorari) ("Justice Gorsuch's scholarly analysis of the Constitution's nondelegation doctrine
in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future cases.").

123

d.

Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 426 (1944)); id. at 2143.
124
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president under Article II."125 Other elements of Justice Gorsuch's
analysis seemed amenable to the important questions requirement
urged by Justice Kavanaugh. Justice Gorsuch cited Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence in the Benzene case, 126 and Justice Gorsuch
recognized the Executive's power to "fill up the details." 12 7 Nor did
Gorsuch need to choose between the two tests in Gundy. As he
explained, the Act granted the Attorney General broad discretion to
determine whether its registration requirements and criminal
penalties would apply to pre-Act sex offenders. 128 Justice Gorsuch
found that this delegation impermissibly granted power to establish
new requirements of criminal law and thus "make the 'important
policy choices' that belong to Congress." 129

Justice Gorsuch is no faint-hearted originalist, and in Gundy he
unabashedly urged the Court to set aside "an understanding of the
Constitution" that he believed to be "at war with its text and
history."1 30 According to him, "federal statutes granting authority to
the executive were comparatively modest" "[b]efore the 1930s,"131
and only more recently has the Court's lax application of the
intelligible principle requirement failed to constrain impermissible
Gorsuch's
historical
powers. 1 32
delegations of legislative
assumptions led him to conclude that the current intelligible
principle requirement "has no basis in the original meaning of the
Constitution" or "in history." 133
As noted above, Justice Gorsuch's analysis relied on deficient
accounts of Founding-era history, 134 and his dissent has inspired
invaluable new scholarship in which researchers have turned a

125 Id. at 2136-37.
126 Id. at 2145 (citing Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene),
448 U.S. 607,
676, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)); see also Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342 (statement of
Kavanaugh, J. respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting that Justice Gorsuch's "opinion
built on views expressed by then-Justice Rehnquist some 40 years ago in" the Benzene case).
127 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

130

Id. at 2131-32.
Id. at 2145 (quoting Benzene, 448 U.S. at 676 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
Id. at 2131.

131

Id.

132

Id. at 2138 (noting that "the Court hasn't held another statute to violate the separation

128
129

at 2137.

of powers in the same way" since the New Deal).
133 Id. at 2139.
134 See supra note 5.
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more careful eye back to the Founding Era.1 35 This scholarship plays
a critical role in testing Justice Gorsuch's historical assumptions
and determining the fate of originalist arguments for a more
muscular nondelegation doctrine. Founding-era history is essential
to originalists of all stripes,1 3 6 especially for a nondelegation
doctrine that rests on the vague textual contours of "legislative
powers," "necessary and proper" laws, and the "executive power." 137

As the Supreme Court has reiterated, "the practice of the First
Congress is strong evidence of the original meaning of the
Constitution."13 8 Recent research has also focused on early
congressional debates over delegation of power to establish post
roads1 39 and delegations in legislation that imposed the first direct
taxes under the new Constitution. 140
The historical record does not support the broader formalist
conceptions of nondelegable legislative powers urged by Justice
Gorsuch in Gundy. Michael Rappaport outlines formalist claims
that nondelegation concerns categorically barred delegation
involving "coercion of private rights in the domestic sphere," while
placing no limits on delegation that implicated public rights. 14 1 This
135 See supra notes 10-12.

&

136 See Chabot, supra note 14, at 20-21 (noting the import of historical evidence for all
"families" of originalism).
137 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) (describing "legislative power" and "executive
power" as "vague" phrases that admit of "borderline cases").
138 Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1659 (2020);
see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (finding that an act passed by the
First Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose members "had taken part
in framing that instrument," offers 'contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of the
Constitution's meaning" (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983))); J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (emphasizing the importance
of the First Congress's "contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the
founders of our government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in
public affairs" (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926))).
139 Wurman, supra note 12, at 1506-12 (discussing "the post-roads debate"); Mortenson
Bagley, supra note 11, at 350 (discussing "the Second Congress's debate over the nation's post
roads").
140 See generally, e.g., Parrillo, supra note 10 (discussing the Executive's rulemaking power
under the "direct tax" of 1798).
141 See Rappaport, supra note 10, at 3, 7 ("While the strict tier applies to the regulation of
private rights, the lenient tier extends to public rights."); MCCONNELL, supra note 40, at 32829 (borrowing is a delegable "prerogative power" that involves "the management or control of
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two-tiered doctrine is difficult to reconcile with the text of Article I,
which defines "legislative powers" to include sovereign powers
affecting both public and private rights. 142 Nor does it align with
early congressional debates over the delegation of legislative
powers, as these debates focused on the constitutionality of
delegating important public determinations regarding borrowing
and post roads. 14 3 Supporters of the two-tiered doctrine instead rely
on implicit background understandings from eighteenth-century
England 144 and a "negative inference" drawn from an understanding
that early Congresses delegated broadly with respect to public but
not private rights. 145

None of these arguments
anticipated Nick Parrillo's
groundbreaking research on the first direct taxes imposed under the
new Constitution. 146 Parrillo explains that proponents of the twotiered doctrine have missed the direct tax legislation as a "major
counterexample" of Founding-era delegations that involved
"coercive and domestic" regulation of private rights. 14 7 The direct
tax legislation operated largely as "a tax on real estate" 14 8 and
established "a federal board of tax commissioners" for each state. 149
These multi-member boards consisted of principal executive

various government resources or activities rather than lawmaking"); id. at 100 (arguing that
the "power to tax" was an "exclusively legislative" power); Mascott, supra note 10, at 1449
("[M]embers of Congress viewed themselves as the actors responsible for reaching finely
grained policy determinations ... [to] bind the public."); cf. Hamburger, supra note 10, at 107
("[E]xecutive power is the nation's force and does not include the power to create rules or
adjudications with legal obligation.").
142 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
143 See infra Section III.A.2 & Part IV.
144 See MCCONNELL, supranote 40, at 331 (arguing that the distinction between delegable
"prerogative powers" and the non-delegable "legislative power to make laws binding on the
people" "corresponds ... to the line drawn by the King's Bench in The Case of Proclamations
and restated by Blackstone").
145 Parrillo, supra note 10, at 1302 n.49 ("In general, a negative inference can be drawn ...
if early Congresses refrained from doing the action." (emphasis added) (citing Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 743-44 (1999))); see also Hamburger, supra note 10, at 107 (asserting the lack
of evidence that the Executive imposed "binding rules or adjudications" in the United States).
146 See generally Parrillo, supra note 10 (providing "the first in-depth study of the
administration of the 1798 direct tax").
147 Id. at 1302.
148

Id

at 1326.

149

Id

at 1327
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officers15 0 who were tasked with determining "just and equitable"
valuations for particular tax assessment districts in each state. 15 1
The legislation granted officers great discretion under an "openended" allowance for "just and equitable" valuations 152 and forced
them to make controversial policy choices when adjusting tax
burdens.15 3 The delegation of binding rulemaking power to these
officers drew no constitutional objections and ultimately became a
settled practice in the United States. 154 Parrillo's research casts
grave doubt on claims that a two-tiered doctrine became part of our
Constitution.
This research leaves open a substantial debate about the
continued viability of Justice Gorsuch's originalist arguments for a
stronger nondelegation doctrine. In a leading article, Nicholas
Bagley and Julian Davis Mortenson contend that "[t]here was no
nondelegation doctrine at the Founding." 155 They base this assertion
on extensive analysis of pre-ratification materials,1 56 as well as an
overview of Founding-era legislation in which Congress delegated
broadly and without constitutional objections. 157 While the
constitutionality of some of these delegations may depend on
whether they implicate powers that Article II assigns to the
Executive, 158 Bagley and Mortenson offer examples that do not
present this concern. In the first Patent Act, for example, Congress
Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
150

at 1327-28.
at 1339 (quoting Valuation & Enumeration Act, ch. 70, § 22, 1 Stat. 580, 589 (1798)).
at 1369.
153 See id. at 1393-94 (anticipating disputes over relative tax burdens for urban and rural
areas); see also id. at 1403 (disputing applicability of state valuation laws).
154 See id. at 1430-31 (noting "absence of recorded constitutional objections" to this
practice); see also id. at 1429-37 (describing the "enduring acceptance" of rulemaking power
in later direct tax legislation).
155 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 367.
156

See id. at 289-332.

157 See id. at 332-49 (examining various areas in which the First Congress delegated its
authority).
158 Compare Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(recognizing a greater allowance for delegation of "powers ... constitutionally vested in the
president under Article II"), with Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 280 (advocating for
an "empty vessel" theory of executive power that would likely not provide the allowance
recognized by Gorsuch), and Wurman, supra note 12, at 1544 (arguing that some of the
generous delegations described by Mortenson and Bagley fall "within the 'constitutional
space' of another branch").

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

110

[Vol. 56:81

delegated its Article I, Section 8 power to grant exclusive patent
rights to a Patent Board. 15 9 This statute left many important
questions unanswered, and Bagley and Mortenson recount how it
required the Board to establish rules requiring that inventions be
nonobvious.16 0 In patent law, the doctrine of nonobviousness is an
important requirement that forces inventors to show a higher level
of creativity than novelty alone, and John Duffy describes this
doctrine as a "central and fundamental pillar of innovation law." 16 1
Based on their survey of early statutes and other historical
materials, Bagley and Mortenson conclude that the "Constitution at
the Founding contained no

discernable

. . . prohibition

on

delegations of legislative power, . . . so long as the exercise of that
power remained subject to congressional oversight." 162 While their
primary

targets

are

originalist

arguments

for

a

stronger

nondelegation doctrine, Bagley and Mortenson's refusal to recognize
any substantive limits on delegation carries broader implications.
On their view, as an originalist matter, courts could never strike
down legislation for lack of an intelligible principle.1 63 But their
overview of early statutory provisions omits significant contextual
evidence, including the First Congress's debates over the
constitutionality of delegating borrowing power as well as policies
that executive officers ended up determining pursuant to debt and
patent legislation. 164

In a leading response, Ilan Wurman attempts to trace the
important questions distinction from Wayman back to the

See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 338-39. These rules most likely reflected
guiding principles articulated in individualized rulings issued by the Patent Board.
161 John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV.
1, 2, 6 (2007).
162 Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 280.
163 Id. at 279-80. This approach aligns with the "naive view" that "a statutory grant of
authority to the executive branch . . . can never amount to a delegation of legislative power."
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 1723.
164 Compare Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 338-39, 344-45 (devoting just over one
page to patent legislation and under two pages to debt legislation), with infra Part III
(discussing the First Congress's debate over the delegation of borrowing power, important
debt policies decided by the President and the Sinking Fund Commission, and the Patent
Board's determination of legal parameters needed to resolve competing patent applications).
159

160
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Founding. 65 Wurman identifies several episodes in which James
Madison raised concerns over delegations of important legislative
powers.1 66 While Madison's concerns were not always reduced to law
and, in one instance, presented distinct constitutional concerns,1 67
Wurman recounts a critical episode in which James Madison and
other members of the Second Congress disputed the
constitutionality of a statutory amendment that would have
delegated the power to establish post roads (another important
Article I, Section 8 power) to the President. 168 After this debate,
Madison and other members of the Second Congress refused to
delegate initial decisions on the placement of post roads to the
Executive Branch. 169 Based on his review of this episode and other
Founding-era statutes and historical sources, Wurman concludes
that "the picture the Founding-era history paints is one of a
nondelegation doctrine whereby Congress could not delegate to the
Executive decisions over 'important subjects."' 170 While he contends
that originalism still justifies the move to a stronger nondelegation
doctrine, his portrait concludes that delegations allowing regulation
of "[p]rivate rights . . . are undoubtedly more important than"
delegations involving "public" matters. 171
166 See Wurman, supra note 12, at 1517 ("Marshall seems to have recognized that there is
a category of 'exclusively' legislative power ... that Congress could not delegate ... "). Gary
Lawson argues that the important questions distinction from Wayman can be explained by
reference to the "private law of agency" in the eighteenth century. Lawson, supra note 12, at
20. The problem with Lawson's approach is that agency law created an inference of authority
to subdelegate "at both tails of the distribution," or to resolve both the most and the least
important questions at issue. Id. Thus, agency law actually permitted delegation of important
questions.
166 See Wurman, supra note 12, at 1508, 1512 (noting Madison's objections to post roads
legislation and the Alien Friends Act).
167 See id. at 1512-14 (describing Madison's opposition to the Alien Friends Act); see also
id. at 1515-16 (noting other nondelegation objections to bills that passed). The delegations
effectuated by the Alien Friends Act created a "union of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial
powers" in the President. Id. at 1514 (quoting 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2008 (1798)). See generally
CAROL BERKIN, A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 201-10 (2017) (recounting debate over the Alien and
Sedition Acts). Individualized applications of criminal and deportation laws by a lawmakerexecutioner-and-judge-in-one presented due process concerns distinct from those raised by
other delegations of power to the Executive.
168 See Wurman, supra note 12, at 1506-10.
169 Id. at 1506.
170 Wurman, supra note 12, at 1497.
171 Id. at 1556.
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This Article moves the debate forward by supplying new
originalist evidence of the restrained nondelegation doctrine that
the First Congress applied to debt and intellectual property rightspublic matters that figures such as Hamilton, Madison, and
Jefferson regarded as some of the most important questions facing
our fledgling Republic. 172 This evidence demonstrates that public
matters were important and that there was a nondelegation
doctrine at the Founding. Still, the limited constraints recognized
and adopted by James Madison and other members of the First
Congress undermine arguments for a requirement that Congress
resolve all important policy questions in legislation. The general
understanding recognized and applied by the Framers instead
aligns most closely with today's intelligible principle requirement.
This understanding refutes arguments that current nondelegation
doctrine reflects demonstrable errors and must be set aside to
comply with the original meaning of the Constitution.
III. THE FIRST CONGRESS'S DELEGATION OF IMPORTANT

QUESTIONS
Congress's initial legislation established the infrastructure of a
new government. This daunting task forced the First Congress to
address the constitutionality of key structural attributes of
departments. 173 While early statutes creating
executive
departments such as the Department of Foreign Affairs did not
implicate enumerated legislative powers, other statutes that would
have delegated enumerated legislative powers to the Executive
Branch presented significant constitutional concerns. A prohibition
on the delegation of legislative powers was proposed in the initial
round of amendments to the Constitution, 174 and some members of

See infra Part III.
See Chabot, supra note 14, at 23-24 ("All Founding-era statutes incorporate, at least
implicitly, Congress's . . . interpretations of the Constitution with respect to the particular
structure enacted.").
174 See Wurman, supra note 12, at 1504 ("The powers delegated by this Constitution are
appropriated to the departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that . . . the
Executive [shall never] exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial
[Branches] ..... (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 789 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834))); see also
172
173

2021]

THE LOST HISTORY OFDELEGATION

113

Congress raised delegation concerns before passing several early
statutes.
In 1789, delegation concerns prevented Congress from agreeing

on permanent legislation to establish the postal system. 175 It settled
on temporary measures that incorporated "regulations of the postoffice . . . as they last were under . . . the late Congress."

176

Nevertheless, Congress soon had to confront the delegation of other
enumerated powers related to borrowing, repayment of debt, and
intellectual property. 177 Congress addressed all of these delegations
before it returned to the issue of establishing postal roads in 1791.
The sections below discuss the First Congress's delegation of
legislative powers in these areas.
A. THE FIRST U.S. LAWS ON BORROWING AND REPAYMENT OF
DEBT

Repayment of the national debt was one of the greatest
challenges facing the First Congress. An enormous debt loomed over
the new nation, as the Constitution obligated the United States to
repay pre-existing debt based on foreign and domestic loans taken
out to fund the Revolutionary War. 178 To add to this high "price of
liberty," 179 some states also retained large debts from their wartime
efforts, and state efforts to collect funds for repayment of debt

JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION 133-37 (2018) (recounting debates over these

amendments).
176 See MASHAW, supra note 6, at 45 ("The first attempt at bringing the Post Office under
the new Constitution . .. failed because of a dispute over delegation."); see also LEONARD D.
WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 77-79 (1948) (outlining

arguments against delegation of the power to create post roads); CURRIE, supra note 21, at
146-47 (same); cf. Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into ConstitutionalLaw:
How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
671, 702 (2007) (noting that "a post road" was a "tangible" benefit "that every federal
Representative could bring his constituents").
176 Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 16, 1 Stat. 70 (expired 1790).
177 See supra notes 16-28 and accompanying text.
178 See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.").
179 HAMILTON, supra note 20.
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threatened to compete with federal revenue collection.1 80 By 1790,
the overall amount of debt was so large that current levels of
revenue "could not have redeemed debt," and the United States'
ability to "cover even the interest on its debt" was "dicey." 181 In
addition to the assumption of state debts by the federal government,
a central part of Congress's response to this debt turned on statutes
that delegated power to borrow and pay debts to the Executive
Branch.

1. Alexander Hamilton's Proposal. Congress initially asked
Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury, "to devise a
plan to repay the nation's debts." 182 In response, Hamilton prepared
a Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit, in
which Hamilton outlined an extensive plan for refinancing state and
federal debts and issuing new U.S. securities to meet current
interest payments. 18 3 In addition to assuming state debts, Hamilton
recommended that the United States restructure interest payments
in order to "bring the expenditure of the nation to a level with its
income."184

Hamilton urged Congress to take two further measures to
support the United States' credit. First, he called on Congress to
appropriate funds for repayment of the debt. To this end, Hamilton
proposed that the net proceeds of the post office be placed at the
disposal of a Sinking Fund Commission comprised of "the VicePresident of the United States or President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice,
Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney-General of the United
States." 185 The Commissioners would apply these proceeds "to the
discharge of the existing public debt, either by purchases of stock in
180 RICHARD SYLLA & DAVID J. COWEN, ALEXANDER HAMILTON ON FINANCE, CREDIT, AND

DEBT 72 (2018) (noting the goal of reducing competition for resources between the federal
and state governments").
181 Richard Sylla & Jack W. Wilson, Sinking Funds as Credible Commitments: Two
Centuries of US National-DebtExperience, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 199, 208-12 (1999).
182 SYLLA & COWEN, supra note 180, at 69.
183 HAMILTON, supra note 20. This report was not subject to the subsequent and
unsuccessful argument that a "reference to the Secretary" "on [the] subject[] of loans" was an
unconstitutional "delegation of the authority of the Legislature." 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 722
(1792).
184 HAMILTON, supra note 20.
185 Id
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the market, or by payments on account of the principal, as shall
appear to them most adviseable." 186
Second, Hamilton called for new loans that would allow the
United States to repay debt in a cost-effective manner. Hamilton
proposed that the Sinking Fund Commissioners "be authorised,
with the approbation of the President of the United States, to
borrow, on their credit, a sum, not exceeding twelve millions of
dollars." 187 The borrowed money would allow "a new loan, at a lower
interest" to replace "part of the foreign debt." 188 Additionally,
Hamilton proposed that the borrowed funds be applied to "the
purchase of the public debt" in the form of U.S. securities, "at the
price [the debt] shall bear in the market, while it continues below
its true value." 189 This measure "would tend to raise the value of
stock" that creditors held in the form of U.S. securities and would
play a critical role in supporting the United States' credit.19 0
Without purchases to stabilize the value of U.S. securities, these
securities might lose value, trade well below par, and limit the
United States' ability to issue new debt on favorable terms. It is no
surprise that Hamilton proposed delegating this power to the
Commission. The timing and magnitude of purchases needed to
bolster the value of U.S. securities would necessarily turn on the
Commissioners' discretion in gauging fluctuating market
conditions. The goals of raising the value of U.S. securities and
supporting U.S. credit were not aims that could be effectuated
through rigid statutory commands.
2. The First Congress Rejected a ConstitutionalObjection to the
Delegation of Borrowing Power. Hamilton's proposal called for
delegation of legislative powers enumerated in the Constitution: the
power "to pay the Debts" and the power to "borrow Money." 19 1 Under
Hamilton's proposal, a majority of the recipients of this delegated
power would be commissioners who held existing offices in the
Executive or Judicial Branches: the Secretary of the Treasury, the

1861d.
187

d.

Id.
189 Id.
188

190

Id.

191 U.S. CONST. art.

I, § 8.
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Attorney General, the Vice President, and the Chief Justice. 192 Only
one of five commissioners, the Speaker of the House, would belong
exclusively to the legislative branch.19 3 Hamilton expressed no
constitutional qualms about delegating legislative powers to borrow
or repay debt in this fashion.
Congress did not hand over the borrowing power lightly. By the
time the matter came before the House of Representatives in May
of 1790, Congress had departed from Hamilton's recommended
delegation to the Sinking Fund Commission and had proposed that
the Secretary of the Treasury or the President be granted the power
to take out new loans. 194 This proposed delegation of borrowing
power to executive officers drew a constitutional objection when it
was debated in Congress. This May 19, 1790 debate was recorded in
detailed notes taken by Thomas Lloyd, "the favored reporter," who
recorded the House of Representatives' debates in shorthand. 195 The
First Congress's debate over delegation of borrowing power is
summarized in the Annals of Congress 196 and has also been noted
by David Currie. 197

In this debate, William Loughton Smith questioned whether a
delegation of borrowing power under Article I, Section 8 would raise
the same constitutional concerns as a delegation of power to
establish post roads and offices (another enumerated power under
Article I, Section 8):
The question on former occasion had great weight.
Congress [is] vested with the power of borrowing money.
The question is whether [we] can delegate that power to
[the] President. The establishment of [the] post office

supra note 20.
Id.
194 See Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1348.
195 Tinling, supra note 16, at 519, 521. Lloyd's Notes offer the best available evidence of the
May 19, 1790 debate. Id. at 530 (explaining that Lloyd's shorthand notes add "much to our
knowledge of what was said"). While James Madison disputed the "accuracy" of Lloyd's notes,
he still recognized that "the ideas of the speakers[] may for the most part be collected from
them." Id. at 537; James Madison to Edward Everett, 7 January 1832, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/99-02-02-2503.
196 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1584-85 (1790).
197 See CURRIE, supra note 21, at 73 n.143 ("Smith doubted whether Congress could
delegate its power to the President at all.").
192 HAMILTON,
193
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was altered on that account because the Constitution
said Congress alone had the power of establishing post
offices. The bill was altered. It must have more weight
on this occasion. The words in the Constitution are
express. The question, then, [is] whether [Congress is]
authorized to delegate such importantpower.198
One might think the question of delegation would consume the
entire debate among members of the House of Representatives,
especially given Congress's earlier refusal to delegate power to
establish post offices based on an identical constitutional concern.
But notes of Congress's proceedings show that this was not the case.
Smith's question did not even arise as part of a motion to block
delegation to the Executive Branch. Instead, James Madison had
initiated a motion directed at a different structural aspect of the
borrowing: the executive officer to whom power would be granted. 199
Madison feared that Congress "will by degrees introduce the (ideas)
of departments into execution of laws" and moved "to strike out" the
part of the bill delegating borrowing power to the "Secretary of
Treasury" and to "insert 'President of the United States'" in its
place. 200 While part of Madison's concern no doubt reflected his lack
of confidence in Secretary Hamilton, 20 1 Madison also framed his
objection in constitutional terms: "In this government where the
executive and legislative powers [are] separated, where a law [for]
borrowing money passed, the execution referred to the head of [the]
executive department." 20 2 He questioned the committee's choice to
"vary[" this arrangement by delegating power to the Secretary of
the Treasury instead of the President, 20 3 as "in that form" it would

198 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1349 (emphasis added); see also 2 ANNALS OF CONG.
1584 (attributing Smith's positions to William L. Smith of South Carolina).
199 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1348.
200 Id.
201 See BERKIN, supra note 167, at 14 (describing Madison's "moral" objection to the part of
Hamilton's proposal that would "pay off government certificates to current rather than
original holders").
202 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1348.
203 Id. Madison appeared to reject Hamilton's proposal to delegate borrowing power to the
Sinking Fund Commission on the same ground. Id.
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"depart from" the "genius of [the] Constitution." 20 4 Madison's
opening comments reflected absolutely no concerns over a
delegation of borrowing power to the Executive Branch, so long as
an initial law authorizing the borrowing had passed. 20 5 For
Madison, the "importance" of the borrowing power meant only that
Congress should delegate this power to the President as head of the
Executive Branch: "If anything [was] of sufficient importance to
justify, refer to the head of that department." 20 6 Delegation to the
President was Madison's answer to concerns about implementing a
borrowing power that Madison understood to involve "great trust"
and "the execution of one of the most (important laws)." 20 7
Other members of the House addressed Smith's concern about a
delegation of borrowing power more directly. They supported the
delegation of power to execute borrowing authority so long as
Congress passed an initial law with some limitation on the amount
to be borrowed. Benjamin Huntington emphasized that the
enumerated borrowing power did not require members of Congress
"to turn borrowers themselves." 20 8 He continued to explain that the
President was "not given general authority to borrow money ad
libitum," or at pleasure, "but by loan." 209 Huntington opined that the
"appropriation attending the sum loaned" operated as a "limitation"
on the President's borrowing power. 210 Michael Stone likewise
emphasized the importance of a congressionally specified limit on
the President's borrowing power: the proposed legislation was
constitutional because it had "not delegated[] the power to borrow
money generally but [only a] particular sum." 211 John Laurance's
204 Id. Madison recognized that the President would "make[] use of [the] Secretary as the
agent" in borrowing. Id.
205 Id. at 1350 (statement of Madison) (noting obliquely that "[t]he gentlemen think that
because Congress has power to borrow money-When the law passed, the execution [is now]
within the executive department"); see also Rappaport, supra note 6, at 365 (noting that in
England, "Parliament often provided [the King] with discretion to determine whether to
borrow, how much to borrow, and on what objects to use the funds").
206 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1350.
207 Id. at 1354.
208 Id. at 1351.
209 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1351.
210 Id. Elbridge Gerry also urged Congress to "confine the loan solely to [the] purpose of
paying off the debt," id. at 1355, although his statements appeared to reflect a normative
interest in avoiding more debt.
211

Id. at 1349.
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comments focused on the President's general constitutional power
to execute laws passed by Congress, and he opined that it was
"[o]nly necessary to say borrow" in legislation to allow the President
to claim broad responsibility and "see it executed." 212 While these
statements did not suggest Congress had to decide much, a cap on
the amount to be borrowed would ensure that Congress delegated
some quantum of power less than its whole borrowing power under
Article I, Section 8.213 Thus, the limitation would prevent Congress
from completely undoing the initial allocation of powers established
by Article I.
Taken as a whole, these comments support the delegation of
borrowing power with some cap on the amount borrowed. They do
not suggest an understanding that the Constitution required
Congress to resolve all major questions surrounding the borrowing
power or eliminate executive discretion in its enabling legislation.
No one proposed statutory language to limit executive discretion by

having Congress specify critical parameters such as limits on the
interest rate, discounts or commission fees commonly taken out as
a percentage of the loans, or which foreign loans to repay first.
Much of the debate acknowledged that the law would award
great discretion to the Executive Branch and focused on whether
the proposed legislation should vest the greatest possible amount of
discretion by assigning the borrowing power directly to the
President. Thomas Fitzsimons questioned a direct delegation to the
President on the ground that it would be "easier to call [the] officer
of treasury to account than the President if he should
mismanage." 2 14 Additionally, Fitzsimons emphasized that the
treasury department was "bound by laws." 215 Presumably, he
referred to ex post and structural controls established by the
Treasury Secretary's duties to "report" his actions to Congress and
to follow a specified process to grant "warrants for monies to be
issued from the Treasury." 216
Theodore Sedgwick also contemplated the President's ability "to
apply the sum to arrears and installments in such [a] manner as his
212 Id. at 1352.
213 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
2
14Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1349.
21Id.
216 Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat 65, 66.
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discretion thinks fit" and questioned whether the President would
choose to report "the minute detail" of these actions. 2 17
Representative Samuel Livermore focused on the importance of
issuing out borrowed money through the Treasury, as this
Department had "officers established for every step of this business"
and could ensure that the funds were "issued out according to the
law." 218 William Smith, who appeared to back off of his absolute
objection to any delegation of borrowing power, suggested that
Congress was vested with "power, [to] declare the terms of loan, and
carry out through the proper officer." 219 In making this point, Smith
emphasized the Treasury's greater accountability to Congress: "The
treasury [has] to report to Congress[,] but [Congress has] no control
over the President unless we impeach him." 220 A majority of these
objections thus focused on the greater accountability that reporting
and other structural controls on disbursement would grant to
Congress.
James Madison maintained that the President would still retain
sufficient accountability and reporting duties under the existing
constitutional framework. Madison argued that the President
would be "responsible" to Congress because he was "impeachable"
and would therefore "be glad to discuss" his actions with
Congress. 22 1 Madison also argued that the Constitution favored the
vesting of important matters such as borrowing in the President,
based on "the practice of parliament ...

to empower His Majesty to

borrow[,]" but noted "diversity of opinion" on this issue. 222 Some
members of Congress supported Madison's motion based on the
related understanding that the President "would necessarily be the
officer and have the supreme control under the Constitution, not
under the law." 223
In addition to constitutional arguments, some members of the
House emphasized practical benefits of delegation to the President,
217 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1349-50.
218 Id. at 1353.
219 Id. at 1354.
220 Id. at 1354.
221 Id. at 1350. Madison assumed that Congress could "request information" about moneys
loaned by the President, and that "it would be [a] proper ground of impeachment" if the
President refused the request. Id.
222 Id. at 1354.
223 Id. at 1353 (statement of Bland).
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noting that his direct role might "add to the respectability of the
loan" 224 and help the United States "get money on easy terms." 225
Other members disagreed that the choice of executive officer posed
a

"Constitutional

question." 226

According

to

Sedgwick,

"[a]s

Congress [is] authorized to borrow money, Congress can determine
the instrument by which [to] execute the power. It is nothing more
than [a] question of convenience or inconvenience." 22 7 Sedgwick and
others also favored the greater structural control that Congress
retained over the Secretary of the Treasury. 228
Madison's motion ultimately prevailed, and the House decided to
vest borrowing power

directly in the President. 229 Thirty-two

Representatives voted in favor of this amendment. 230 It is unclear
how much of this vote was based on Madison's constitutional
argument as opposed to the practical considerations that weighed
in favor of a delegation to the President. With respect to the
constitutional objection to delegation, however, the decision to vest
borrowing power in the President plainly rejected Smith's initial
objection to any delegation of this power whatsoever. Congress's
decision was also inconsistent with Smith's further understanding
that Congress should delegate only more limited executory duties to
a lesser officer positioned to "carry out" Congress's wishes. 231 After
hesitating to delegate the establishment of post roads and offices to
the Executive Branch, the First Congress delegated a different
legislative power to the President: the power to borrow money. The
majority's decision to vest borrowing power in the President rather
than the Secretary of the Treasury also meant it had chosen the
structure awarding the Executive Branch a greater amount of
discretion. And James Madison referred to this discretion as
involving "a great trust" in "the execution of one of the most
(important laws)."232

224

Id. at 1351 (statement of Huntington).

Id. at 1348 (statement of Stone).
226 Id. at 1354 (statement of Sedgwick).
225

227

Id.

228

Id. at 1354-55.

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1584 (1790) ("The motion was carried in the affirmative. . .").
Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1355.
231 Id. at 1354.
229
230

232

Id.
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Not everyone agreed that Congress should grant the President
so much power, and the Representatives who opposed delegation to
the President included Smith, Sherman, Livermore, and
Sedgwick. 233 But even these Representatives did not press Smith's
general objection to a delegation of legislative powers, and Smith
himself also seemed to drop this point and instead focused on the
relative accountability of the Secretary of the Treasury and the
President to Congress. 234 Sherman, Livermore, and Sedgwick's
primary objections to the President's discretion also turned on the
greater accountability inherent in the Secretary's duty to report
borrowing and disbursement activities to Congress after the fact. 235
Smith appeared to be the only Representative to suggest that
Congress should be the one to "declare the terms of [a] loan," and
even then, he emphasized the importance of ex post controls that
required "treasury to

report

to

Congress." 236

None

of

the

Representatives who opposed a broad delegation of discretionary
authority to the President suggested that Congress should avoid the
problem by passing a more detailed law or dictating limits on key
terms in order to cabin the President's discretion. The notion that
the Constitution banned capacious statutory language or legislation
that handed off major national policy questions to the Executive
Branch was not even a well-developed minority position in the First
Congress's lengthy debate on this issue.
The constitutional objection to delegation was ultimately
dismissed by a majority of the House when it voted in favor of a
broad delegation of borrowing power to the President. 237 One cannot
reconcile the legislation that delegated borrowing power to the
President with an important subjects theory of delegation.
Arguments in favor of delegation recognized that the President
would necessarily have broad discretion to determine key terms of
consequential loans and that Congress need only cap the total
amount borrowed to satisfy its constitutional requirements. The
First Congress's understanding is close to today's intelligible

233

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1584 (1790) (listing representatives who "were in favor of the clause

as it stood in the bill").
23
4 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1354.
235 Id. at 1349-53.
236 Id. at 1354.
237 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1584 (1790).
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principle requirement. As noted below, early Congresses repeatedly
delegated broad discretion over important subjects in subsequent
debt legislation.
3. The Borrowing Legislation Delegated Broad Discretion to
Determine Important Terms of Loans. Legislation passed by the
First Congress granted the Executive Branch broad discretion to
resolve important questions related to borrowing money and paying

debts. In its August 4, 1790 "Act Making Provision for the [payment
of the] Debt of the United States," Congress addressed foreign
debt. 238 The Act authorized the President to take out up to $12
million in "new loans" for payment of "arrears of interest" and
installments due on "the principal" of foreign debt, and "if it can be
effected upon terms advantageous to the United States .

.

. paying

debt." 2 39

off the whole of the said foreign
The Act also authorized the
President "to cause to be made such other contracts respecting the
said debt as shall be found for the interest of the said States." 240 The
Act established only two parameters for the President to follow
when taking out loans to pay off or refinance foreign debt: First, any
"sum or sums" borrowed could "not exceed[] ... twelve million"
dollars in total.241 Second, repayment of any "engagement [or]
contract" must occur "within fifteen years." 242
Otherwise, the President had extremely broad discretion to
borrow any amount ranging from $0 to $12 million. The Act set no

parameters for interest rates on loans designed to fund payments of
principal and interest on pre-existing loans. It instructed the
President to obtain only "terms advantageous to the United States"
for any loan "paying off the whole of the said foreign debt." 243 The
Act was completely silent on the related question of discounts, or
"commission fees" as they were known at the time, which could
range from 3.5% to 9% of the amount borrowed. 244 Professors

Mortenson and Bagley also point out that these provisions lacked
238

Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138 (obsolete) (alteration in original).

239

Id. §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. at 139.

240

Id.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id.

244

See James C. Riley, Foreign Credit and Fiscal Stability: Dutch Investment in the United

§ 2.

States, 1781-1794, 65 J. AM. HIST. 654, 659 tbl.1 (1978) (listing commission fees for Dutch
loans to the United States).
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specific instruction on "which debts to pay first" and whether to
prioritize repayment or restructuring. 245 Given Congress's earlier

consideration of the constitutionality of delegating borrowing power
to the Executive Branch, and common knowledge of unavoidable
borrowing terms such as interest rates and commission fees for
existing loans, the statute plainly delegated the President power to
decide important terms of these loans.
Congress's decision to allow new loans of up to $12 million gave
the President vast discretion over both the total amount to be
borrowed and the terms of the loans. In general, a law that "merely
state[s] the maximum amount that the executive may" borrow but
does "not indicate how much between zero and that amount the
executive must" borrow leaves broad discretion over the amount
loaned. 246 The sizeable outer limit on permissive borrowing, up to
$12 million, magnifies the scope of the President's discretion. While
raw figures from 1790 do not afford a ready comparison to sums that
might reflect significant portions of today's national economy, at the
time, $12 million was an immense sum. It was on the scale of the
$15 million that the United States would spend to double the size of
the United States in the 1803 Louisiana Purchase. 247 When $12
million is considered as a percentage of the gross domestic product
(GDP) in 1790, and then converted to an equivalent percentage of
the GDP today, the total amount that the President could borrow in
current terms would be equivalent to $1.286 trillion.24 8
Even the potential variation in annual interest or discount rates
on $12 million afforded the President great discretion over the
amount of interest and fees that the United States would have had
to incur to obtain new loans. As mentioned above, the Act did not
address commission fees, failed to specify an upper limit for the
interest rate, and at most presumed that "advantageous" terms for
Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 344-45.
Rappaport, supra note 6, at 317 (noting the similar policy discretion imposed by
permissive' appropriations" that allow the Executive to "spend no more than X dollars").
247 See The Louisiana Purchase, supra note 22 (listing the price of the Louisiana Purchase
as $15 million).
248 This figure is based on an estimate that $12 million represented 6% of the nominal U.S.
GDP in 1790, which then stood at $189 million. In current terms, $1.286 trillion is 6% of the
$21.43 trillion nominal U.S. GDP from 2019. Louis Johnston & Samuel H. Williamson, What
Was the U.S. GDP Then?, MEASURINGWORTH, http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2021).
245
246
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refinancing would result in a rate lower than those the United
States was currently paying in interest. 24 9 It remained up to the

President to determine how advantageous the new interest rate
would be. If the President obtained $12 million in loans at a rate of
5% instead of 4%, for example, 250 the United States would owe an
additional 1%, or $120,000 in annual interest. When this amount is
converted into a percentage of today's GDP, it is equivalent to
$12.86 billion. 251 Both the discretion to borrow up to $1.286 trillion
and to incur an additional $12.86 billion in interest (in today's
dollars) must be considered important. 252
The President's execution of borrowing power further illustrated
how many decisions Congress left up to the Executive Branch. As
was expected, after Congress vested borrowing power in President
Washington, the President enlisted Alexander Hamilton as his
agent in obtaining new loans. 253 Hamilton had already discussed the
possibility of a new loan with Dutch bankers earlier in the year, as
both the United States and the Dutch were eager to refinance the
United States' substantial debt to France. 254 On August 28, 1790,
Hamilton wrote the Dutch bankers to inform them of the new loans
authorized by Congress: "the Legislature of the United States ...
passed two Acts" by which "they empower the President to cause to
be borrowed on account of the United States Fourteen Millions of
Dollars." 255 The power to borrow up to $14 million reflected loans
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139.
See HAMILTON, supra note 20 (predicting that interest rates would "fall at least as low
as five per cent" and may also "sink still lower, probably to four" percent over time).
251 This figure reflects 6% of the U.S. GDP, based on an estimate that $120,000 represented
6% of the nominal U.S. GDP in 1790. See supra note 248.
252 This is over a hundredfold greater than the threshold for "major rules" under the
Congressional Review Act, which provides for congressional review of rules with "an annual
effect on the economy of $100,000,000." 5 U.S.C. § 804(2)(A).
253 Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 28, 1790), in Washington
Papers, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-020167 (instructing Hamilton to borrow "on the best terms which shall be found practicable
(and within the limitations prescribed by Law as to time of repayment and rate of interest)").
254 SYLLA & COWEN, supra note 180, at 105-06 (noting that part of the French loans were
funds provided by Dutch bankers "with guarantees provided by the [K]ing," and the early
phases of the French Revolution caused the King to seek quick repayment of these debts).
25 Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Sec'y of the Treasury, Treasury Dep't, to Wilhem and
Jan Willink, Nicholaas and Jacob Van Staphorst, and Nicholas Hubbard (Aug. 28, 1790)
[hereinafter Hamilton's Letter], https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-02249
250
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authorized in two separate acts: the Act of August 4, 1790, which
authorized the President to borrow up to $12 million to refinance
and pay interest on foreign debt, 256 and the Act of August 12, 1790,
which authorized the President to borrow up to $2 million to repay
domestic debt. 257 Hamilton's letter also explained that the President
had "committed" the "execution" of borrowing power to him and
included a copy of the President's commission to Hamilton. 258
Hamilton agreed to key terms of this initial loan from the Dutch
bankers. The bankers would provide a loan in the amount of "three
Millions of florins" 259 (roughly equivalent to $1.2 million) at an
interest rate of 5%, plus 4.5% in commission fees. 260 Hamilton
requested that the loans conform to the fifteen-year reimbursement
period established by the Act of August 4, 1790.261 Hamilton also

expressed his desire for, but did not insist on, business "so regulated
as to give it the form of two loans" and to allocate separate funds to
the distinct foreign and domestic loans authorized by the Acts of
August 4 and August 12, 1790.262 The decision not to insist on

separate loans would later subject Hamilton to congressional
scrutiny. 26 3 Hamilton reported to Congress that, due to the "very
nature of the case," he felt that a "considerable latitude of
discretion" attended the loans he took out on the President's
behalf.264
The borrowing power that Congress had awarded Washington
and Hamilton was so vast that it afterward raised questions about
Hamilton's compliance with the borrowing laws. In 1791, Congress
passed a further Act to clarify that commission fees of 4 .5 % on the

0488-0001; SYLLA & COWEN, supra note 180, at 107-08 (quoting Hamilton's Letter, supra
note 255).
256 See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139.
257 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 4, 1 Stat. 186, 187. See infra Section III.A.4 for discussion
of the Sinking Fund Act.
258 Hamilton's Letter, supra note 255.
259Id.
260
261
262
263

264

OF

Riley, supra note 244, at 658, 659 tbl. 1 (listing an exchange rate of $0.40 to one guilder).
Hamilton's Letter, supra note 255.
Id.
See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT RELATIVE TO THE LOANS NEGOTIATED UNDER THE ACTS
THE

FOURTH

AND

TWELFTH

OF

AUGUST,

https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Hamilton/01-14-02-0013-0001.

1790

(1793),

2021]

THE LOST HISTORY OFDELEGATION

127

August 28 loan and future loans under the August 12 Act were
"within the true intent and meaning" of the Act and its provision
"limit[ing] the rate of interest to five per centum." 265 Presumably,
this provision was intended to assure future creditors that loans
including such commission fees would qualify for the August 12
Act's appropriations of sums and guarantee of repayment. 266

In other instances, the broad discretion conferred by the
borrowing laws allowed Hamilton's enemies to mount a political
attack against him. Thomas Jefferson connived an objection that
was taken up by James Madison and William Giles in Congress. 267
In his September 9, 1792 letter to President Washington, Jefferson
complained of Hamilton as "the man who has the shuffling of
millions backwards and forwards from paper into money and money
into paper, from Europe to America, and America to Europe." 268 In

1793, Giles submitted to the House of Representatives allegations
that Hamilton violated the law in dispersing proceeds of loans under
the Acts of August 4 and August 12, 1790.269 As recounted by

Leonard White, Giles charged Hamilton with misappropriating
"part of the funds borrowed under the act of August 4 ...

to buy a

portion of the domestic debt," when the Act authorized repayment
of foreign debt only.270
James Madison spoke at length to support the charges against
Hamilton. In addition to arguing that Hamilton had allocated more
funds to the Sinking Fund Commission than allowed by statute,
Madison argued that Hamilton had violated the President's
instructions when taking out loans. 271 Madison claimed that
President Washington's written commission to Hamilton granted
only the authority to borrow funds intended to repay foreign debt. 272
266 Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 218, 219.
266 Hamilton previously emphasized the creditworthiness demonstrated by the "actual

appropriation"of "funds for payment of the Interest." Hamilton's Letter, supra note 255.
267 WHITE, supra note 175, at 352.
268 Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Sept. 9, 1792),
https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Jefferson/01-24-02-0330.
269 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 900 (1793) (proposing that Washington fire Hamilton).
270 WHITE, supra note 175, at 353.
271 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 939 (1793) ("[I]f the moneys drawn had been carried to the
Sinking Fund, the limited sum of $2,000,000 would have been exceeded.. . "); id. (referencing
"the contradictory steps" that Hamilton took against the President's instructions).
272 Id. at 935-36.

128

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:81

The Dutch loan that Hamilton agreed to on August 28, 1790
arguably exceeded this commission by taking out a single loan for
money that would repay both the foreign and domestic debt. 2 73
Madison emphasized that Hamilton's discretion to borrow money
ought to have been sharply limited to the loans expressly authorized
by the President, who under the Acts of August 4 and August 12,
1790 possessed far greater discretion to borrow money than the
Secretary of the Treasury. 274 Madison reasoned that Hamilton had
only limited statutory authority as Secretary of the Treasury. 275 As
a result, Hamilton did not automatically share the "great" power
reflected in the Acts giving the President "latitude as to the terms
and contracts" for loans amounting to the vast sum of $14 million. 276
Other members of the House questioned Madison's censure, noting
that the President's complete instructions to Hamilton may not
have been disclosed and that the President made no "objections to
the conduct of his agent." 277
Madison's case foundered on the inability to show that Hamilton
had disobeyed the President, and a majority of the House ultimately
exonerated Hamilton. 278 The need to base the charges against
Hamilton on his failure to follow presidential instructions further
illustrates the great discretion conferred by the borrowing laws.
Hamilton had not violated the minimal requirements of the
borrowing laws, and the legality of his actions was ultimately
determined by the President rather than terms set by Congress.
4. The Sinking Fund Legislation Delegated Key Monetary Policy
Decisions. Congress effectuated another key part of Hamilton's
proposal in a second statute designed to fund repayment of domestic
debt. This statute also awarded broad discretion to the Executive
Branch. In its August 12, 1790 Act, Provision for Reduction of the
Public Debt, Congress empowered the Sinking Fund Commission

273 Id. at 937 (asserting that Hamilton diverted the loan for "a purpose different from that
specified and required by his instruction").
274 See id. at 942 ("[T]he authority of the Secretary, in executing the loans, and the

appropriation of them, must be derived from the President. . . ").
275 Id. at 941.
276 Id. at 942. Madison doubted "whether an equal power will ever be committed to a
successor" but accepted the delegation to President Washington. Id.
277 Id. at 952.
278 Id. at 956-64.
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and the President to pay the debt. 279 The Sinking Fund Commission
was a five-member board comprised of the Secretary of the Treasury
(Alexander Hamilton), Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson),
President of the Senate/Vice President (John Adams), the Attorney
General (Edmund Randolph), and the Chief Justice (John Jay). 280
Rather than requiring a formulaic repayment of debt, this Act
granted the Sinking Fund Commission and the President discretion
to "purchase ...

debt of the United States"-in the form of U.S.

securities-"in such manner, and under such regulations as shall
appear to them best calculated to fulfill the intent of this act." 281
As explained in the Act, Congress intended the Commission's
purchases to both "effect a reduction of the amount of the public
debt" and benefit "creditors of the United States, by raising the price
of their stock." 282 The Commission's and President's power to carry
out purchases fulfilling these dual mandates was capped only by the
requirement that purchases of debt, in the form of U.S. securities,
be at "market price, if not exceeding the par or true value thereof." 283
In other words, the Commission could support creditors who
purchased U.S. securities only to the point of ensuring that they
would receive the par or true value of these debt instruments.
Congress granted the Commission and President wide discretion
over the magnitude of purchases by funding them through a surplus
of revenues based on import duties. 284 It also allowed the President
to borrow an additional $2 million to support further purchases. 285
The Act afforded the Commission tremendous discretion to
decide when and in what amount to enter the market and buy U.S.
securities. 286 Any purchase of U.S. securities would serve the Act's
first goal of reducing the amount of debt, but the second goal of
raising the value of U.S. securities required the Commission to
exercise great discretion. The Commission had to apply expert
financial judgment to determine the timing and magnitude of
279

See Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186.

Id. § 2.
281 Id. §§ 1-2.
282 Id. at 1 Stat. at 186.
283 Id
§ 1.
284 See id. at 1 Stat. at 186-87.
285 See id. § 4.
280

286

The Commission and the President shared discretion to approve purchases. See Chabot,

supra note 14, at 5-6.
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purchases needed to prop up the value of U.S. securities. 287
Congress did not specify particular market conditions or a
percentage of loss in value of U.S. securities required for the
Commission to intervene, nor did it suggest the magnitude of
purchases that would amount to an appropriate intervention. The
Commission's policy decisions on these matters had enormous
implications for the national economy and private creditors who
held these securities. If the Commission failed to make a timely or
sufficient intervention, jittery investors might flood the market with
devalued U.S. securities and jeopardize the United States' ability to
obtain future credit through sales of additional securities.
The Sinking Fund Commission's open market purchases of debt,
in the form of U.S. securities, revealed disputes over discretionary
spending decisions and intractable policy disagreements between
Hamilton and Jefferson. The Commission began to expand open
market purchases in a manner designed to stabilize the value of
U.S. securities in 1791, with authorization of purchases up to
$400,000.288 By 1792, a steep market crash and financial panic
created "an episode of crucial economic and political importance"
and called out for more Commission purchases to stabilize the
market. 289 Hamilton sent the Treasurer to the market to purchase
additional government securities with funds that the Commission
had approved earlier. 290 While these purchases were designed to
"maintain or restore the price of Government securities in the face
of the panic,"291 Hamilton did not think they were sufficient. He

287 See Barry Sullivan & Christine Kexel Chabot, The Science of Administrative Change,
52 CONN. L. REV. 1, 79 (2020) (discussing how expert judgment inheres in the Federal
Reserve's open market purchases).
288Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, [15 August 1791], FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-09-02-0045.
289 Richard Sylla, Robert E. Wright & David J. Cowen, Alexander Hamilton, Central
Banker: CrisisManagement During the U.S. FinancialPanic of 1792, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61,
61 (2009).
290 See
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Adams (Mar. 20, 1792),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0124 (noting the Treasurer's
authority to purchase securities); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Thomas Jefferson (Mar.
20, 1792), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-23-02-0263 (same).
291 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to John Adams, supra note 290, at n.1.
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urged the Commission to approve further purchases of U.S.
securities without delay.292

The facts of the financial panic were not in dispute, but the
Commissioners disagreed over both the law and policy dimensions
of the appropriate response. As the market prices of U.S. securities
continued to plummet, the Commissioners disagreed whether to
purchase these securities at prices that seemed to exceed their
rapidly declining worth.293 Four of the Commissioners met in
Philadelphia and split 2-2 on this issue. 294 Only Hamilton and

Adams

agreed

securities,

295

to

immediate

purchases

of

devalued

U.S.

while Jefferson and Randolph would have waited for

the fifth Commissioner, Chief Justice John Jay, to cast the deciding
vote.296

Chief Justice Jay could not vote because he was tending to
judicial duties in New York. 297 The Commissioners told Jay that
their "difference of opinion" respected "the construction of their
authority under the Act" 298 and whether purchases of devalued
securities at market prices would unlawfully exceed "the par or true
value" of the securities. 299 In response, Jay offered to write an

opinion on this disputed "law [q]uestion" and send it to the
Commission "[e]xpress."Saa The need "to operate immediately, if at
all" led Hamilton, Adams, and Randolph to accept Jay's offer to
provide a written opinion.30 i At the time, it was doubtful that Jay's
292 See Sylla & Cowen, supra note 180, at 78 (recounting additional purchases urged by
Hamilton).
293 See Sylla et al., supra note 289, at 79 (noting Jefferson's objection "that the 'true values'
of [certain securities] were lower than their market prices").
294 See
Letter
from John Adams
to John Jay n.1
(Mar. 21,
1792),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0126 ("The four trustees of the
sinking fund . .. hav[e] been divided ... " (quoting Letter from Edmund Randolph to John
Jay (Mar. 21, 1792))).
291 See id.
296 See Sylla et al., supra note 289, at 78 (noting Jefferson and Randolph's desire "to delay
action until Jay returned" to vote).
297 See
Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Mar.
23,
1792),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0141.
298 Letter from John Adams to John Jay, supra note 294.
299 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 1, 1 Stat. 186.
300 Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton, supra note 297.
31 See Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund [26 March 1792], FOUNDERS
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0155.
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legal opinion would resolve the Commissioner's dispute. Jefferson
dissented from the decision to seek Jay's written opinion at all,3 0 2
and observers suggested that "Mr. Jay's opinion ...

will not decide

voce."30 3

the business-that his vote must be viva,
Chief Justice Jay's legal opinion operated as a Founding-era
precursor to "step one" of modern-day Chevron analysis, which asks
whether Congress has "directly spoken to the precise question at
issue" by ruling out a proposed agency action as a matter of law.30 4

In particular, the Chief Justice addressed whether the term "true
value" created a purchasing constraint in addition to the
requirement that purchases not exceed par value.3 05 The
grammatical placement of the conjunction "or" after "par" and
before "true value" led him to conclude that the meaning of "or" was
"precisely equivalent to" phrases such as "that is to say; in other
words, to wit."3 06 Thus, Chief Justice Jay opined that the phrase
"true value" did not create an additional constraint on the
Commission's purchases and that the Act's restrictions operated
only to exclude purchases in which the market price exceeded par
value.30 7 The Chief Justice's analysis confirmed that the
Commission retained broad discretion to make the open market
purchases urged by Hamilton.
The legal issues determined by Jay's March 31, 1792 letter
resolved some but not all of the Commissioners' disagreement. After
Jay issued this letter, Edmund Randolph joined Hamilton and
Adams to cast the deciding and necessary third vote to approve up
to $100,000 in additional purchases by the Sinking Fund
Commission.30 8 But Jay's opinion established only the upper limits
of the Commission's authority and never resolved the broader policy
302 See id. ("Resolved, (the Secretary of State dissenting) [t]hat the said question be stated
in writing, and forwarded to the Chief. . . ").
303 Letter from Philip Livingston to Alexander Hamilton
(Mar. 24, 1792),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0144 (recounting the opinions of
Schuyler and Livingston).
304 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
305 Letter from John Jay to Commissioners of the Sinking Fund
(Mar. 31, 1792),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0175.

306 Id.
307Jd.

308 Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund [4 April 1792], FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0187.
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dispute between Jefferson and other members of the Commission.
Notwithstanding Jay's opinion letter, Jefferson continued to dissent
from the Commission's disbursal of $100,000 for additional
purchases, approved on April 4, 1792,309 and from its further
disbursal of up to $200,000, approved on April 12, 1792.310 A
manuscript styled "Dissenting Opinion on the Sinking Fund"
described the "Secretary of State" as "continuing to dissent from"
estimates of certain securities' "true value" as reflecting purchase
prices approved by the Commission on April 12.311 Jefferson's
continued opposition to what were arguably inflated purchase
prices has been explained as an objection to an unfair windfall to
speculators 312 or a desire "to injure Hamilton" and the "financial
revolution he led."3 13 Whatever the precise reasons for Jefferson's
continued objections, they were not quelled by the Chief Justice's
legal analysis. Jefferson would not have used open market
purchases to provide U.S. creditors with the same level of support
that other members of the Sinking Fund Commission found
appropriate in this case.

As illustrated by this episode, the August 12 Act afforded the
Commission and President broad discretion to implement monetary
policy. Congress authorized these executive actors to invest millions
of dollars in purchases of U.S. securities when, in their judgment,
the timing and magnitude of their purchases would check the
s09 See id. ("[T]he Secretary of State dissents.").
310 See Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, [12 Apr. 1792], FOUNDERS

ONLINE
[hereinafter
April
12
Sinking
Fund
Meeting],
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-11-02-0225 ("From so much of the
above resolution as relates to the purchase of three per cent. and deferred stock, the Secretary
of State dissented.").
311 See Dissenting Opinion on the Sinking Fund, [12 Apr. 1792?], FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-27-02-0786 (disputing the estimate of
"three percents at more than 10/ the pound" (footnote omitted)). The Commission's April 12
resolution approved purchases of three percent at prices up to "twelve shillings in the
pound"-the level it had earlier applied on August 15, 1791. Meeting of the Commissioners of
the
Sinking
Fund
[15
August
1791],
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-09-02-0045; April 12 Sinking Fund
Meeting, supra note 310 (approving new purchases "on the principles of the resolution of the
15th day of August, 1791").
312 See Dissenting Opinion on the Sinking Fund, supra note 311 (noting purchase policies
that "the Virginian evidently regarded as a prop to speculators").
313 Sylla et al., supra note 289, at 79.
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declining market value of securities held by creditors of the United
States. Noted economic historians credit Hamilton's open market
purchases as being part of a series of "central-banking crisismanagement techniques" that "successfully contained" a major
financial panic in 1792.314 The 1792 crash threatened to "destroy[
America's financial revolution" and "the country's relative
prosperity."3 15 The monetary policies implemented by the Sinking
Fund Commission's discretionary open market purchases helped
prevent this catastrophic outcome.31 6
5. Congress Continued Granting the Executive Broad Discretion
to Pay Debt and Borrow Funds for "Public Purposes." Congress
continued to grant broad discretion over borrowing and open market
purchases to repay debt in subsequent legislation. Despite
Congress's concerns over Hamilton's management of borrowed
funds under the Acts of August 4 and August 12, it continued to
award the Executive great discretion over funds borrowed for
"public purposes" in subsequent legislation. 317 In a 1794 Act,

Congress authorized the President to borrow a "sum not exceeding
one million of dollars" if, "in his opinion, the public service shall
require it."318 The Act did not address commission fees, allowed for
"interest not exceeding five per centum," provided that the loans
were "reimbursable at the pleasure of the United States," and
allowed the borrowed funds "to be applied to such public purposes,
as are authorized by law." 3 19 Congress passed a similarly openended authorization for a loan of up to $2 million in December of
that year. 320

Congress also continued to award discretionary power to the
Sinking Fund Commission in legislation passed in 1792 and 1795.
The 1792 legislation continued the Commission's power to manage
debt through open market purchases: Congress again authorized
the Commission to "purchase the debt of the United States, at its

314

Id. at 63-65.

315 Id.
316
317

at 63.
See id. at 63-65.
Act of Mar. 20, 1794, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 345, 345 (obsolete).

318 Id.
319 Id.

320 Act of Dec. 18, 1794, ch. 4,

§

1, 1 Stat. 404, 404 (expired).
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market price, if not exceeding the par or true value thereof." 32 1
While the 1792 legislation limited the Commission's earlier and
controversial purchasing discretion by requiring it to obtain the
"lowest price" that could "be obtained by open purchase," 322
Congress still left the overall amount and timing of purchases up to
the Commission. 323 By 1795, the Commission's open market
purchases had enjoyed so much success that Congress no longer
needed to worry that U.S. debt would trade below par value. 324
Congress therefore shifted the Sinking Fund Commission's role
away from open market purchases designed to bring U.S. debt to
par value and charged the Commission with managing the
repayment of debt.
As part of the Commission's new role in managing funds used to
repay debt, Congress awarded the Sinking Fund Commission power
to borrow sums up to $1 million, with the President's approval. The
Commission was to borrow these funds "from time to time ...

in

anticipation of the revenues appropriated," to reimburse the loans
"within a year," and to borrow at an interest rate that "shall not
exceed six per centum." 32 5 This statute preserved executive
discretion over whether or not to borrow, contained no limit on
commission fees, and set only an upper limit on interest rates. 326
Congress awarded the Commission a further power to borrow, with
the President's approval, "sums requisite for the payment of the
said instalments or parts of principal" on all "public debt" as it
becomes due. 327 Here, Congress did not specify a dollar amount to
limit the total amount of the loan, provided that interest "shall not
exceed six per centum," and allowed the Commission and President
to raise these funds through new securities offerings sold at par or
above. 328
321 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 38, §§ 6-8, 1 Stat. 281, 282-83 (requiring the President's
approbation of Commission-approved purchases).
322 Id. § 8, 1 Stat. at 283.
323 See id. § 7.
324 See Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 45, § 10, 1 Stat. 433, 435-36 (obsolete) (authorizing the
Commission to issue new U.S. securities, or "stock," and requiring that "no such stock be sold
under par").
325 Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 433.

See id.
Id. § 10, 1 Stat. at 435-36.
328 Id
326

327
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Taken as a whole, these statutes show that Congress adhered to
its initial practice of delegating broad discretion to resolve
important policy questions regarding borrowing and payment of

debt. This debt legislation establishes that the First Congress
repeatedly delegated important aspects of legislative powers to
borrow money and pay the debt to the Executive Branch. In so
doing, Congress plainly rejected constitutional objections to
delegations of significant power to borrow money. There are no
records of qualified objections suggesting that Congress lacked
power to delegate important questions. Even if such objections had
been raised, they were overruled by legislation delegating some of
the most important policy questions facing our fledgling Republic to
the Executive Branch.
B. THE FIRST U.S. PATENT LAW

Intellectual property rights were also central to the developing
economy of our fledgling nation. Robert Merges recounts that "[t]he
patent system was one of the earliest instruments of economic
development put in place by the young United States." 329 As a
result, officers who granted patents "participated in the most
important job of the new national government: building the
institutional infrastructure to support and promote economic
activity." 330 In his Report on Manufactures, Alexander Hamilton
lauded the patent system's "encouragement of new inventions and
discoveries." 331 Hamilton emphasized that these new inventions and
discoveries ranked "among the most useful and unexceptionable of
the aids, which can be given to manufactures" in the United States'
developing economy.332

329 Robert P. Merges, The Hamiltonian Origins of the U.S. Patent System, and Why They
Matter Today, 104 IOwA L. REv. 2559, 2562 (2019); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at
265 (explaining that early theories of "economic development" encouraged "construction of
infrastructure and technology" by granting exclusive rights).
330 Merges, supra note 329, at 2560.
331 ALEXANDER

HAMILTON,

REPORT

ON

THE

SUBJECT

OF

MANUFACTURES

https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007
HAMILTON REPORT ON MANUFACTURES].
332 Id.

(1791),

[hereinafter
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Congress's initial patent legislation followed on the heels of the
Framers' decision to include an Intellectual Property Clause in the
Constitution. Article I provides that "Congress shall have Power" to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 333 This provision was crafted
against the general backdrop of the English system and the Statute
of Monopolies, which permitted patents (or "letters patent") as an
exception to the general prohibition against state-sanctioned
monopolies. 334 Now

that the federal

government

could

grant

exclusive rights to national patents, there were many questions as
to how Congress would go about awarding these intellectual
property rights to inventors.

A major concern was how the federal government would address
federal patents for inventions that already implicated conflicting
patent rights at the state level. In particular, steamboat inventor
John Fitch and his rival, James Rumsey, had long fought over
exclusive rights to steamboat technology in the United States. 335
Their earlier disputes had attracted the attention of towering
political figures such as George Washington and Benjamin
Franklin, 336 and Fitch and Rumsey obtained a conflicting and
overlapping patchwork of patent rights from state legislatures. 337

On one occasion, their competing patent claims had so frustrated a
state legislative committee in Pennsylvania that it wished for "a
body better possessed than the legislature . . . of the means of

inquiring and examining into [the] originality and merits" of the
inventions. 338 For Fitch and Rumsey, exclusive rights to steamboat
technology in only certain states proved unsatisfactory because
333 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
334 See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51,
63 n.51 (2010) (noting that it is "plausible" "the Founders were aware of the Statute of
Monopolies"); cf. Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and ConstitutionalNorms, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 272, 330-31 (2004) (finding no "direct evidence" that the United States'
Intellectual Property Clause was "drawn up in order to reproduce" English law).
336 See Edward C. Walterscheid, Priorityof Invention: How the United States Came to Have
a "First-to-Invent"Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263, 270-73 (1995).
336 Id.
337 Id. at 271-73.
338 Id. at 279 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 EDMUND B. O'CALLAGHAN, THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 1083-84 (1849)).
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these limited patents would not cover "a market large enough to
support extensive manufacturing." 339

Both inventors "viewed the new federal system as a means of
finally resolving their priority contest." 340 Now that the Constitution
enabled Congress to establish a uniform system of national patents,
many expected Congress to grant national patents and resolve
competing claims in private bills, 34 1 which had been the earlier

practice of state legislatures. 342 But Congress never took up this
role. Instead, the First Patent Act delegated critical questions
regarding the issuance of patents to the Executive Branch.
1. Congress Required the Patent Board to Determine "Causesof a
Very Great Magnitude." The First Congress considered markedly
different mechanisms for the issuance of patents. While these
mechanisms all included delegation of power to grant patents, they
ranged from a modified version of the English registration system
to a French examination system. 34 3 English practice was limited
and did not provide an effective way to resolve disputes between
competing applicants such as Fitch and Rumsey. 344 As a result,
Congress's initial bills attempted to improve on English practice 345
by providing procedures and substantive rules for "interferences,"
or procedures in which "two pending applications ...

cover the same

discovery or invention." 346 Substantively, Congress considered a
first-to-invent standard, which would award patent rights to "the
first true inventor or . . . discoverer." 34 7 Procedurally, Congress
339 KENNETH W. DOBYNS, THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT
OFFICE 16 (1994).
340 Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 292.
341 See Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First
Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 243, 248, 253 (1940) [hereinafter
Proceedings in Congress] (recording Fitch's and Rumsey's petitions).
342 See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, at 267-68.
343 See Greg Reilly, Our 19th Century Patent System, 7 IP THEORY 1, 8-9 (2017) (noting
that Congress's initial bills "would have created a registration system for patents similar to
that then-developing in England," but Congress ultimately opted for an examination system).
344 See Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 269 ("[N]othing in the contemporaneous English
common law of patents or the administrative practice dealt in any real sense with priority of
invention . .. ").
345 Proceedings in Congress, supra note 341, at 363 (noting that the bill was "framed

according to the Course of Practice in the English Patent Office").
346 Interference, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910).
34 Prager, supra note 32, at 162-63.

2021]

THE LOST HISTORY OFDELEGATION

139

contemplated having different government actors select a winner
from the competing applications. After an early bill placed this
determination with a jury of "twelve good and lawful men," 348
Congress moved interference proceedings to the Executive Branch.
The new bill allowed "three judicious, disinterested" referees to
"determine the priority of the said inventions or discoveries, and
certify the same to the Secretary of State." 349

When debating a motion to eliminate juries, members of a House
committee recognized that interference proceedings could
determine "causes of a very great magnitude."3 5 0 Some members of
the committee favored executive referees' "competen[ce] to judge"
"matters of invention" and the "much greater probability of having
justice done by [these] arbitrators, who are men of science."3 5 1
(Although Congress had not yet settled on his precise role, Secretary
of State Thomas Jefferson, who was also "known for [his] scientific
talent," 35 2 was expected to play a leading role in the operation of the
Patent Act.) Other members of the committee opposed the motion
to eliminate juries on the ground that executive determinations
would "depriv[e] the citizen of a right."3 53 The motion ultimately
passed with the conclusion "that the right of trial by juries is not
universal."3 5 4 In the context of interference proceedings, the shift
away from juries was consistent with a general understanding that
initial patent grants involved privileges or public rights. Such
privileges could be conferred by the Executive Branch without a jury
because they were forward-looking and did not eliminate existing
property rights.35 5

348 Id. at 162 (drawing quotations from a brief that Fitch filed with the Pennsylvania
Assembly on September 11, 1789).
349 Proceedings in Congress, supra note 341, at 358-59 (providing for referees "mutually

chosen by the parties" where possible).
3So 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1413 (1790).
351 Id. at 1464.
352 Prager, supra note 32, at 165.
353 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1463 (1790).
354 Id. at 1464.
355 See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1373 (2018) ("This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to
grant a patent is a matter involving public rights .... "); HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 198
(noting that "[t]he initial grant of a patent ... was a grant of a benefit or privilege" that "the
executive could issue").
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The general understanding of patent-grant-as-privilege did not
account for the significant interests of persons who held pre-existing
state patents. Inventor John Fitch held steamboat patents in five
states and filed objections in Congress after the committee voted to
eliminate juries' role in priority determinations.3 5 6 Fitch claimed
that the new federal law would expose him to "great Vexation and
Expense, from Prosecutions" because it did not carve out an
exception for pre-existing state patents. 357 In the absence of a jury,

both Fitch and his rival Rumsey asked Congress to decide their
claims directly by petitioning for federal patents in private bills, and
Fitch

expressly

grounded

his

petition

in

pre-existing

state

patents. 358 Congress turned these petitions away and left grants of
federal patents to the Executive Branch, opening the door to
executive decisions that would limit important interests in state
patent rights.

For reasons not disclosed by the historical record, the Senate left
patent grants to executive officers and wholly eliminated the
detailed interference framework considered in earlier bills.3 59 The
Senate's amendments switched to an examination system inspired
by French law.360 Under this system, original determinations of
patentability rested with a Patent Board "consisting of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary for the Department of War, and
the Attorney General." 3 6 1 Edward Walterscheid concluded that the
examination system "completely removed the proposed mechanism
356 See Proceedingsin Congress, supra note 341, at 361-62 (containing Fitch's "objections
to striking out the clause" that would have afforded a "Trial by Jury").
357 Id. at 362.
358 See id. at 248, 253 (recounting petitions that Fitch and Rumsey presented to the House
of Representatives).
359 See Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 317-18 ("[T]he Senate, for unknown reasons,
completely removed any provision dealing with either caveats or mechanisms for determining
priority of invention ...
").
360 See id. at 290 (noting the shift from an English-style registration system to an
examination system); see also Prager, supra note 32, at 165 ("The patent act, as approved on
April 10, 1790, adopted a system quite close to that advocated by Franklin and Rumsey .... ");
id. at 158-59 (quoting a June 6, 1789 letter from James Rumsey to Thomas Jefferson urging
Jefferson to support the French examination system); Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and
the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 269, 279 (1995) [hereinafter
Walterscheid, Jeffersonian Mythology] (concluding that Jefferson "quite likely approved of'
the change to an examination system).
361 Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 290.
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for establishing priority of invention and substituted nothing in its
place."36 2 As a result, "the Patent Act of 1790 came into being with
no provision whatever concerning how priority of invention should

be established."3 63
The text of the Patent Act makes clear that Congress left large
gaps for the Patent Board to fill. For example, Section 1 allowed
"any person or persons" to petition the Patent Board for a patent.3 64

The Act required that petitions set forth "any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement
therein not before known or used."3 65 Because this wording limited
the requirement that the invention or discovery be "not before
known or used" to improvements,36 6 it did not preclude a federal
patent for many inventions that were already known or used in the
states. The Act authorized a Patent Board comprised of the
Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and Attorney General, "or any
two of them," to consider petitions and grant patents "if they shall
deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and
important."36 7 This open-ended process for initial grants of patents
made no mention of interference proceedings or how the Board
should determine factual questions related to patent grants.
Once the Board granted a patent, the Act bestowed substantial
monopoly rights upon the patentee. The Board's initial
determination of a patent's usefulness and importance was not
subject to judicial review, and a patentee could bring a cause of
action against anyone who infringed his or her exclusive rights and
recover the infringing item along with damages awarded by a
jury.36 8 In this action, the patent would provide "prima facie
evidence" that the patentee was "the first and true inventor" or

362 d.
363 Id. at 290-91; accord P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 237, 248 (1936) (observing that "no provision was made" for "the possibility of several
different applicants claiming a patent for the same invention").
364 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109 (repealed 1793).
365 Id., 1 Stat at 110.
366 Id.; Prager, supra note 32, at 165 (noting that Congress did not provide guidelines for
patent officers "other than the undefined concept of 'invention or discovery' and their own
opinion as to what is 'sufficiently useful and important"').
367 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
368 Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 111.
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"discoverer" of the patented item.369 A competing inventor could
challenge the patentee's status as the "first and true inventor" only
as a defense to an infringement action 370 or in litigation seeking
repeal of an existing patent in a district court "within one year" after
its issue. 371 An action to repeal a patent was risky, moreover,

because the Act required an unsuccessful plaintiff to "pay all such
costs as the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit." 372 The
favorable presumptions for federal patentees placed them on
superior legal footing and probably even bestowed outcomedeterminative advantages in close cases. These presumptions and
advantages flowed directly from the Board's initial award and
underscored why federal patent grants constituted "causes of a very
great magnitude." 373

2. The Patent Board Created Its Own Procedure to Address
Conflicting Claims to Steamboat Technology. The Patent Board
soon faced key interference questions left unresolved by Congress.
As recounted by one commentator, "the Patent Board was
considerably disturbed when petitions for patents containing
conflicting claims" to patent a steamboat "were filed by four
different inventors[:] John Fitch, James Rumsey, John Stevens and
Nathan Read." 374 After Fitch filed a caveat objecting to a competing
application, 375 the Patent Board responded 376 and ultimately
scheduled an interference proceeding for all applicants. 377 While the
Act made no mention of interference proceedings, the Patent Board
was quick to fill this gap.
The steamboat dispute proved especially difficult for the Board
to resolve. It implicated years of politicized contests over state
patent rights, including George Washington's notable support for
Rumsey in earlier state proceedings. 378 Given that Thomas
Jefferson, the leading scientific expert on the Patent Board, had
369 d. § 6, 1 Stat. at 111-12.

370 Id.

Id. § 5.
Id.
373 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1413 (1790).
374 Federico, supra note 363, at 248.
37 See Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 293 (describing Fitch's petition).
371

372

376 d. at 294.

377Id.
378

at 295.
See id. at 277
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recently served as Rumsey's patent attorney in France, 379
"Rumsey's agents were elated" to learn of Jefferson's role under the
new Patent Act, and "[t]hey immediately removed [Rumsey's]
application from Congress to the Patent Board." 38 0 Fitch, on the
other hand, was reported to "dislike[] the [Patent] Board
unqualifiedly" and continued to seek relief from Congress in
addition to the Board.3 8 1 After Fitch became concerned that
Rumsey's supporters spent "too much time with Jefferson, visiting
privately in chambers," he requested "that a rule be established
which would require all 'claims, arguments and proofs' to be
committed to writing and 'that either party may have free access to
them."' 382 The Board then required parties to submit "in writing to
the Board a precise statement of their several inventions and of the
extent thereof." 383

Perhaps due to the politically fraught nature of this dispute, the
Patent Board proved reluctant to exercise its delegated power and
"procrastinated" interference proceedings. 384 The Board postponed
its initial hearing based on a new bill that has been attributed to
Thomas Jefferson and was submitted to Congress in February of
1791.385 Jefferson objected

to the entire examination

system

because he and other board members "had insufficient time to
properly carry out" their work on the Patent Board while
maintaining principal offices of Secretary of State, Attorney
General, and Secretary of War.3 86 Jefferson would later recount that
he was "oppressed beyond measure" by the need to resolve weighty
matters in little time and "to give crude and uninformed opinions

379 Prager, supra note 32, at 158 (recounting that Jefferson was "in effect, Rumsey's patent
attorney in France").
380 Frank D. Prager, The Steam Boat Interference: 1787-1793, 40 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 611,
631 (1958) [hereinafter Prager, The Steam Boat Interference] (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citation omitted).
381 Id. at 631-32.
382 Id. at 632.
383 Id.
384 Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 294.
385 Id. at 294-95, 302 ("[The bill] probably was based on a draft written by Jefferson.");

THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF THE USEFUL ARTS (1791),

https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Jefferson/01-22-02-0322.
386 Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 301.
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While Jefferson's proposed
for interference proceedings or
Board's procedural decisions, 388
1790 Act's examination process

with a registration system. 389 Such a system would automate patent

grants and potentially eliminate the need for interference
proceedings.39 0 Congress, however, declined to act and left these
matters to the Patent Board, with no indication that it disapproved
of the Patent Board's interference procedures regarding the
steamboat dispute.3 91

Records of arguments from the interference hearing show that
the Board was poised to establish a substantive, first-to-file rule in
order to select the winning applicant.39 2 Attorney General Randolph
proposed a rule whereby the "earliest applicant must have the
earliest patent."39 3 The rule was thought to favor Rumsey, who had
filed the earlier application with the Patent Board, 394 but Fitch
countered by noting that he "had petitioned to the Congress for an
exclusive right in March 1786, long before the Patent Board was
even founded."3 95 This unexpected response rendered the Board
members "silent for a time."396 According to Fitch, Secretary
Jefferson eventually responded "that [the Board] could make no
distinction in the patents nor give one preference over another."3 9 7

387 Letter from Thomas
Jefferson
to Hugh Williamson
(Apr.
1,
1792),
https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Jefferson/01-23-02-0312.
388 See Walterscheid, Jeffersonian Mythology, supra note 360, at 292 (observing that
Jefferson's bill omitted an "express provision for determining priority of invention").
389 See JEFFERSON, supra note 385.
390 See Walterscheid, JeffersonianMythology, supra note 360, at 297 (noting that Jefferson
also asked Congress to address substantial gaps in the 1790 Act by extending its novelty
requirement and establishing a nonobviousness standard); see also JEFFERSON, supra note
385 (arguing that patent rights should extend to "any new and useful art").
391 See Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 295.
392 See DOBYNS, supra note 339, at 27-28; Prager, The Steam Boat Interference, supra note
380, at 638-39 (describing notes of the Board's Secretary and Rumsey's agent).
393 DOBYNS, supra note 339, at 27.

3941d.
395 Id.
396 d.
397 Id. at 27-28; see also Prager, The Steam Boat Interference, supra note 380, at 638-39
(describing notes from the Board's clerk indicating that a priority determination had "been
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Notes from Rumsey's representative reiterated Jefferson's refusal
to decide the priority issue, as Jefferson was reported to have opined
"that there are but two questions on which [the Board] can
decide."3 98 These questions were "(1) whether the discovery be
sufficiently useful and important," and "(2) the originality" of the
discovery.3 99
But the Board had already undertaken a hearing designed to
resolve the parties' competing applications, and the relief it granted
determined far more than Jefferson let on. Despite Jefferson's
statement that the Board could "make no distinction in the
patents," 400 the Board did just that. It later instructed the Board's
clerk, Remsen, to "draft" the patents of Fitch, Rumsey, and Stevens
"to make them 'distinct."' 40 1 The decision to award distinct patents
seemed to track interference procedures contemplated by an earlier
bill in Congress, H.R. 41, which would have allowed referees to
determine how inventions "differ from each other in any material
circumstance" and to certify their distinct specifications to the
Secretary of State. 40 2 The grants of distinct patents with limited
specifications successfully resolved the priority disputes between
Fitch, Read, and Stevens: the "species of steamboat propulsion" in
Read's patent "was clearly distinct from those covered in the patent
to Fitch," and "[t]he same seems to have been true with respect to
whatever specific mode of steamboat propulsion was granted to
Stevens." 40 3
These distinct patents therefore resolved competing claims for all
but Rumsey and Fitch, who both obtained "overlap[ping] and

considered but not carried through"). But see Federico, supra note 363, at 383 (doubting that
the Board acted "without deciding the question of priority").
398 Prager, The Steam Boat Interference, supra note 380, at 639.
a99 Id.
400 DOBYNS, supra note 339, at 27-28. This account aligns with notes from the Board's
secretary indicating that a priority determination between Fitch and Rumsey had "been
considered but not carried through." Prager, The Steamboat Interference, supra note 380, at
638-39.
401 Prager, The Steam Boat Interference, supra note 380, at 638 (quoting ARCHIBALD
DOUGLAS TURNBULL, JOHN STEVENS: AN AMERICAN RECORD 110 (1928)); Walterscheid, supra
note 335, at 298.
402 Proceedings in Congress, supra note 341, at 358 (referencing "An Act to promote the
Progress of the useful Arts").
403 Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 299.
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conflict[ing]" U.S. patents for "[p]ropelling boats." 40 4 While the
precise reasons for the Board's refusal to resolve this priority
dispute will probably never be known, Jefferson suggested that
courts would ultimately resolve any such dispute.4 0 5 But the Board's

final decision to issue patents on all of the steamboat inventions
instead "broke the two men," and they never took their dispute to
court.4 06 Further, the Board's decision discouraged inventors as well
as "former and potential financiers" from pursuing steamboat
technology during "the fourteen years' term of the federal patents"
held by Fitch and Rumsey.40 7 The Board's decision, therefore,
rendered both inventors' interests in existing state patents
effectively worthless.
Unsurprisingly, many parties in addition to Jefferson urged
Congress to address substantive and procedural rules for
interferences in future amendments to the patent laws. When
Congress finally took up Jefferson's proposed amendments a year
later, it agreed to move to a registration system4 0 8 and considered

various interference procedures. 409 Members of Congress worried
about the expense of creating a new department preferred a
registration system that "circumscribe[d] the duties of the deciding
officer within very narrow limits" and left "disputes arising from
contested claims [to] devolve on referees."4 10 The resulting Patent
Act of 1793 ultimately provided that "interfering applications ...
shall be submitted to the arbitration of three persons" for a "final"
decision as to "the granting of the patent." 41 1 These new interference
procedures stopped short, however, and failed to provide
substantive rules for priority determinations. The lack of definitive

404
405

Federico, supra note 363, at 248 n.29, 250; Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 299-300.
Jefferson suggested that the Board's determination was "appealable to a court andjury."

Prager, The Steam Boat Interference, supra note 380, at 639 (footnote omitted). He probably
referred to the Act's infringement and repeal actions, as the Act did not allow a direct appeal
from the Board's decision. See id. at 639 n.142.
406 Id. at 640-41.
407 Id.

at 641.

See Daniel Preston, The Administration and Reform of the U.S. Patent Office, 17901836, 5 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 331, 332, 334 (1985) (explaining the registration system).
409 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 856 (1793) (considering ex post jury determinations or caveat
procedures to resolve interferences).
410 Id. at 855.
411 Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 9, 1 Stat. 318, 322-23 (repealed 1836).
408
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priority standards in the 1793 Act has led at least one historian to
conclude that the U.S. law on priorities remained unsettled until
1836.412
IV. MADISON'S "NECESSITY" WAS NOT THE MOTHER OF THE
IMPORTANT SUBJECTS DOCTRINE

Not all early statutes delegated as many important questions as
the First Congress's debt and patent legislation. Congress provided
detailed instructions for officers operating the Mint, 413 for example,
and it also accompanied its capacious statutes on borrowing and
repayment of debt with legislation that specified duties for imported
goods in excruciating detail. 414 These detailed statutes merely
reflect Congress's ability to legislate with greater specificity in an
area of overlapping legislative and executive powers when it chooses
to do so. They do nothing to upset the constitutional baseline
reflected in the debt and patent legislation discussed above. The
broad delegations in key Founding-era statutes regarding debt and
patents align with today's intelligible principle requirement, and
they reflect a constitutional requirement that Congress need only
establish some limit on executive power in legislation. When
Founding-era legislation is taken as a whole, 415 it does not support
a decision to overrule precedent and adopt a stronger nondelegation
doctrine.
Some originalists dispute the historical foundations of this
baseline. They place great emphasis on a debate in the Second
Congress and assert that this body recognized a stronger
nondelegation doctrine when passing legislation to establish post
roads in 1792.416 As explained here, however, neither a lone piece of

412 See Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 319 (noting the lack of substantive priority
provisions before 1836).
413 Act of April 2, 1792, ch. 16, § 18, 1 Stat. 246, 250.
414 Act of Aug 10, 1790, ch. 39, § 1, 1 Stat. 180, 180 (obsolete) (specifying duties for imported

goods); see also Mascott, supra note 10, at 1392 (discussing how the First "Congress often
legislated with rigorous specificity").
415 Cf. Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 333 (arguing that the First Congress
delegated broadly "without betraying a hint of concern that doing so might violate the
Constitution").
416 See, e.g., Wurman, supra note 12, at 1506-12.
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legislation from 1792 nor arguments advanced on that occasion
prove a historical requirement that Congress resolve all important
questions. 4 17 Objections to a delegation of power to establish post
roads stymied the First Congress in 1789,418 and the Second
Congress continued to debate this issue when it returned to the
matter two years later. While the Bill for Establishing the Post
Office and Postal Roads was before the House, Theodore Sedgwick
"moved to strike out" the clause "which designated the roads" and
to delegate power to establish routes to the President. 4 19 Sedgwick's
motion renewed debate over the constitutionality and expediency of
a delegation to the President. With regard to constitutional concerns
over delegation, Sedgwick expressed his view that the delegation
under consideration would mirror Congress's practice concerning
"every other subject," in which it was "sufficient that the House
should establish the principle, and then leave it to the Executive to
carry it into effect." 420

While several members of the House objected that the proposed
delegation was unconstitutional, their arguments varied greatly.
Samuel Livermore asserted that Article I, Section 8's provision
empowering Congress "to establish post offices and post roads"
created a congressional "duty to designate the roads" and "to
establish the offices." 42 1 Livermore's argument required Congress to
determine both the very important matter of post roads and the less
important matter of post offices and mirrored William Loughton
Smith's earlier objection to a delegation of borrowing power. 422
Sedgwick responded by comparing delegation of borrowing power to
delegation of power to establish post roads. 423 One might have
expected James Madison, who had previously approved the
delegation of borrowing power over Smith's objection, 424 to favor
417 The public rights implicated by the post roads debate also fail to support a ban on
delegations involving private rights.
418 See MASHAw, supra note 6, at 45.
419 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791).

Id.
Id. at 229-30; see also id. at 233 (including a similar objection by Representative Page).
422 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1349.
423 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 230 (1791) ("Congress ...
[is] authorized not only to establish
420
421

post offices and post roads, but also to borrow money;
Congress . . . [will] borrow every sum ... ?").
424 See Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1350.

but is it understood that
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delegation of power to establish post roads as well. But Madison
switched sides in the Second Congress and opposed delegation of
power to establish post roads on constitutional grounds. What could
explain Madison's newfound opposition to generous delegations?
Both members of the House and scholars have questioned the
sincerity of constitutional objections involving the delegation of
power to select post roads. Congressmen had strong personal
incentives to designate locations of post roads in locations favorable
to their constituents. Representative Barnwell, for example, was
"astonished" "that there should be any question respecting the
constitutionality of the amendment," 425 and Sedgwick pointed out
that the "gentlemen who composed" the committee "had a very
important interest in establishing the directions of the post." 426
Perhaps Madison himself succumbed to this temptation as well,
though such action would be inconsistent with Madison's general
concerns over the precedent established by Congress's early
interpretations of the Constitution. 427 In addition, the constitutional
objection raised here was the same one that had been raised earlier
with respect to borrowing. 428 Borrowing money did not present the
same incentives for members of Congress to pass specific legislation,
and the fact that a constitutional objection was also raised in that
context adds legitimacy to the constitutional objection involving
post roads.
Madison raised unique constitutional objections in the debate
over post roads. He did not argue that Congress had to decide all
important
questions
or
adopt
Livermore's
unqualified
constitutional objection to the delegation of power to establish post
roads and post offices. Instead, Madison asserted "that there did not
appear to be any necessity for alienating the powers of the House;
and that if this [alienation] should take place, it would be a violation

3 ANNALS OF CONG. 235-36 (1791).
Id. at 241; see CURRIE, supra note 21, at 149 (observing that "the House's zest for detail"
could be attributed "more to a taste for pork"); Lawson, supra note 5, at 403 (suggesting that
"postal routes" implicated "the tastiest pork").
427 William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 61 (2019) (noting
Madison's concern over the precedent established by decisions respecting creation of
426
426

government).
428 See Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1349 (reporting Representative Smith's objection to
the borrowing law).
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of the Constitution." 429 Madison noted that the "difficulty of
accommodating the regulations to the various interests" implicated
by the placement of post roads "is said to be almost
impracticable."430 In Madison's view, however, these designations
were capable of being "accomplished" by Congress. 431 Madison
objected to delegation because there was no "exigency" requiring
Congress to delegate establishment of post roads to the Executive. 432
Representative Sedgwick disagreed with Madison's necessity
arguments. 433 But Sedgwick lost the post roads debate, and
Madison's explanation offers the only understanding that can be
squared with the entirety of delegation decisions approved by a
majority of early Congresses. For post roads, Congress rejected a
delegation to the President and designated the initial network of
post roads itself.4 34 But refusal to delegate unnecessary matters is
not the same as refusal to delegate important matters. The post
roads legislation itself illustrates this point. After designating
initial routes, Congress turned around and granted the Postmaster
General unfettered power to enter contracts that "altered" these
routes. 435 Continued use of the post roads designated by Congress
was therefore made contingent on the Postmaster General's
decision to enter into contracts "extending the line of posts"43 6 and
providing that "the roads, therein designated, shall ... be deemed
and considered as post roads." 437
Given the arguments that the Constitution required Congress to
make an initial designation of post roads and offices, it seems
unlikely that the Postmaster General's virtually unfettered ability
429 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238-39 (1791) (emphasis added); see Lawson, supra note 12, at 3536 (identifying Madison's necessity argument).
430 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 238 (1791).
431 Id.

432

Id.

Id. at 239 (containing Representative Sedgwick's assertion that "necessity could not
justify the infraction of [the] Constitution").
433

434

3 ANNALS OF CONG. 241 (1791).

§§ 1-2, 1 Stat. 232, 233 (obsolete) ("[T]he route[] by which
the mails are at present conveyed[] shall in no case be altered . . . till the contracts made by
the Postmaster General shall be determined.").
436 Id. § 2.
437 Id. The Act also delegated power to determine locations of post offices despite Samuel
Livermore's constitutional argument that Congress was required to specify locations of post
offices alongside post roads. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229-30 (1791).
436 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7,
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to alter Congress's initial routes by contract would present any less
of an intrusion on important subjects or Congress's legislative power
to establish post roads. 438 The Postmaster General's contractually
designated routes appeared even more important than those
initially established by statute: routes designated by the Act lasted
only two years, but contracts for post roads could last up to eight
years. 439 Unlike initial designation of routes, however, the
Postmaster General's ability to alter existing routes may have been
necessary. During the debate in the House, Benjamin Bourne

observed that "[i]t will be occasionally necessary to change the
route, and lay out new roads," 440 and Sedgwick asserted that the
power to "establish post roads not provided for by the bill" was
"indispensably necessary." 44 1 While Congress may have been
capable of designating an initial set of roads, future legislation
might have been too cumbersome to accommodate shifting
populations or other dynamic factors calling for an alteration of
routes. Delegation to the Executive was necessary to incorporate
these important adjustments to existing post routes.

Madison and other members of the First Congress may have
assumed a similar necessity when they decided to delegate
borrowing power to the President. It was likely impossible for
Congress to predict, in advance of final negotiations to enter into
loans, the exact terms that might apply to loans adding up to the
formidable sum of $14 million. Even the rate of interest that might
have been "advantageous" to the United States 442 would depend on
evolving market conditions and the United States' other options for
avoiding the negative credit consequences that would ensue if it fell
behind on loan payments. 443
438 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 240 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick) (arguing that provisions
authorizing the Postmaster General "to establish post roads not provided for by the bill" were
equally objectionable); accord Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 353 (describing
Sedgwick's view that these two provisions were both unconstitutional).
439 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, §§ 2, 30, 1 Stat. 232-33, 239. Professor Wurman argues that
Congress resolved all important questions in its initial designation of routes. Wurman, supra
note 12, at 1511. But at most, his argument shows that the historical record is ambiguous.
440 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 232 (1791).
441 Id. at 239-40.
442

Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34,

§

2, 1 Stat. 138, 139 (obsolete).

443 Riley, supra note 244, at 661 (noting that "punctuality in payment of service on a loan"

was considered "the key standard of credit worthiness"). Delegations to the Sinking Fund
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The borrowing legislation qualifies the Second Congress's
unwillingness to delegate decisions about post roads and illustrates
how a constitutional line turning on necessity differs from one
turning on importance. The delegation of borrowing power was
undoubtedly important, leaving necessity as the key difference
between willingness to delegate borrowing power and unwillingness
to delegate placement of post roads. By the Second Congress's
debate on post roads, representatives advanced three different
possibilities for the nondelegation doctrine: (1) Congress cannot
delegate great portions of enumerated legislative powers at all,444

(2) Congress can delegate great portions of enumerated legislative
powers but only when necessary, 445 or (3) Congress may delegate
enumerated legislative powers if it "establish[es] the principle"
(perhaps intelligibly?) and "leave[s] it to the Executive to carry" this
principle "into effect." 446 The first explanation conflicted with
Congress's ultimate delegation of legislative power to designate post
offices and alter post roads, as well as its earlier delegation of
powers to borrow money.

This left the second and third explanations as the only
constitutional arguments that were consistent with most of
Congress's actions. While Madison's necessity argument may be the
only explanation consistent with all of Congress's early legislation,
it is unclear whether his position supports an exception to generally
broad delegations or should be discounted as a one-time departure
from constitutional doctrine. 447 In any event, a long line of cases
applying today's intelligible principle requirement incorporates a

Commission and Patent Board passed without discussion of their apparent necessity. Open
market purchases reflecting financial judgment and changing market conditions necessitated
delegation to the Sinking Fund Commission, and patent grants turning on scientific
determinations of utility, importance, and novelty may have necessitated delegation to the
Patent Board. At least one state legislature had earlier despaired of its ability to make such
scientific determinations. Walterscheid, supra note 335, at 279.
444 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 229 (1791) (statement of Rep. Livermore).
445 See id. at 238-39 (statement of Rep. Madison).
446 Id. at 229 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
447 Arlyck, supra note 10, at 53 (explaining that members of the First Congress did not
frame their debates over delegation of remission decisions in terms of necessity and that the
concept of necessity is "lacking more generally" in Founding-era debates).
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"rule of necessity." 44 8 Even then-Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
Benzene did not turn on importance alone: he argued that there was
"no need" for Congress to delegate the question of "feasible"
workplace safety standards 44 9 because the basic determination of
whether to impose a cost-benefit framework did not exceed
Congress's "technical" or "expert" capacity or necessitate delegation

to an "agency." 450 Madison's similar necessity argument is thus but
another illustration of how Founding-era delegations align with the
status quo. The nondelegation doctrine recognized in the Founding
Era provides no reason to invalidate swaths of broad delegations
entrenched in today's regulatory statutes.
V. THE HISTORICAL RECORD PROVIDES NO OCCASION TO
OVERTURN PRECEDENT

The evidence unearthed in this Article provides new reasons to
question the proposed leap to a stronger nondelegation doctrine.

Precedent looms especially large for the future of nondelegation
because the Supreme Court requires "something more than
'ambiguous historical evidence"' before it will overturn longstanding
constitutional precedent. 451 Proponents of a stronger nondelegation
doctrine test have not met this burden. The claim that an
448 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 684-85 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
449 Id. at 685.
450 Id. at 675.
451 Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (quoting Welch v. Tex. Dep't of
Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 479 (1987)); see also id. at 1980, 1989 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (explaining that "the historical record does not bear out my initial skepticism" or
show that current doctrine is "incorrect, much less demonstrably erroneous"); William Baude,
Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2359 (2015) (noting that "most
originalists" acknowledge theories "reconciling precedent and originalism"); Amy Coney
Barrett, Originalism and Stare Decisis, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1921, 1933, 1937 (2017)
(explaining that Justice Scalia was "willing to overrule precedent" where "the error was
clear," but he would "adhere" to precedent where it "did not clearly contradict the text"); Caleb
Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2001)
(arguing that the 'weaker' version of stare decisis" requires adherence to "permissible" but
not "demonstrably erroneous" precedent); Randy J. Kozel, Original Meaning and the
Precedent Fallback, 68 VAND. L. REV. 105, 108 (2015) (advocating a "presumption of deference
to judicial precedent" when evidence of "historical" meaning does not "provide a clear
answer").
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"important-subjects conception" is "plausibly consistent" with early
practice, 45 2 or that the historical record is simply "messy,"45 3 may be
sufficient to preserve the status quo or to write upon a blank slate.
It does not, however, show demonstrable error or otherwise justify
a departure from longstanding precedent. Perhaps this is why
Justice Scalia's approach to the nondelegation doctrine has been
described as "following precedent" rather than "original
meaning." 454

If any doctrine is closest to the body of generous delegations
debated and approved by the First Congress, it is the intelligible
principle requirement. Unlike Professors Bagley and Mortenson,
who claim that there was no limit whatsoever on the substantive
powers Congress could delegate to the Executive, 455 early
Congresses' debates over borrowing and post roads consistently
recognized the need for legislation to provide at least some limit or
principle to constrain the amount of power delegated to the
Executive. The borrowing legislation passed after the First
Congress's debate approached, and perhaps exceeded, the outer
limits of delegation authorized by the intelligible principle
requirement. Congress allowed the President to borrow any amount
up to a $12 million limit and required that terms of loans designed
to pay off the entire national debt be "advantageous." 456 Congress
likewise directed the Sinking Fund Commission to repay debt
through open market purchases up to par value, while allowing
great latitude as to timing and amount of purchases that reflected
the principle of benefitting creditors and raising the price of their
stock. 457 And in the Patent Act, Congress required the Patent Board
to grant patents for useful, important, and (in the case of
improvements) original inventions, a charge that implicitly afforded
the Board discretion to determine procedures and principles
governing its patent grants. 4 58

Wurman, supra note 12, at 1538.
453 Id. at 1494.
454 Kelley, supra note 105, at 2120.
462

455 See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 11, at 332 ("Regulatory delegations were limited
only by the will and judgment of the legislature.").
456 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139.
457 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 186.
458 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (repealed 1793).
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The minimal limitations and principles contained in the debt and
patent legislation also granted the Executive Branch significant
discretion to resolve crucial matters of national policy. Executive
officers provided the final word on key matters of borrowing,
repayment, and certain aspects of patent grants that were not

subject to judicial review. 459 The tremendous significance ascribed
to debt and patent legislation in the Founding Era is at odds with
Professor

Wurman's

suggestion

that

"[p]rivate

rights ...

are

undoubtedly more important" subjects of delegation than public
matters. 46 0 Alexander Hamilton described the borrowing and
sinking fund measures he offered in "support of the Public Credit"
as relating to "a matter of high importance to the honor and
prosperity of the United States." 46 1 Members of the First Congress
described borrowing as an "important power" (Smith)462 and a
matter of "great trust" and "importance" (Madison). 4 3 Patents also
ranked "among the most useful ...
aidsH which can be given to

manufactures" (Hamilton), 464 involved causes of "great magnitude"
(committee of the First Congress), 465 and often implicated "valuable"
rights (Jefferson).466
Nor did Congress unambiguously resolve all of the important
questions implicated by debt and patent legislation. Professor
Wurman claims that the Sinking Fund Commission operated under
"quite specific limitations" fixed by statutory allowances forbidding
purchases in excess of par value. 467 But neither this statutory
language nor an opinion from Chief Justice Jay resolved Hamilton
and Jefferson's bitter policy dispute. They never agreed on the
extent to which the Commission's below-par purchases should prop
up financial markets and investors. 468 Likewise, Wurman's claim
that "the Patent Board never resolved the first interference case

459

See id.

Wurman, supra note 12, at 1556.
supra note 20.
462 Lloyd's Notes, supra note 21, at 1349.
463 Id. at 1350, 1354.
466

461 HAMILTON,

4

46 HAMILTON REPORT ON MANUFACTURES, supra note 331.
465 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1413 (1790).

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson, supra note 387.
Wurman, supra note 12, at 1547.
468 See supra notes 292-313 and accompanying text.
466

467
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that came before it"469 misses the important policy choices left open
by Congress and resolved by the Board. The Board presided over an
interference hearing of its own creation, definitively resolved two of
four competing patent claims as a result of this hearing, and came
very close to resolving both Fitch's and Rumsey's claims by
implementing a first-to-file test-the opposite of the first-to-invent
test that Congress initially imposed on courts. 470 At most,
arguments that Congress resolved all of the truly important
questions show ambiguity or a nondelegation doctrine "in the eye of
the beholder." 471 They do not establish palpable conflict between
original practice and governing precedent.

Finally, Professor Wurman does not seriously argue that the
First Congress left only details for the President to resolve in its
borrowing statutes. Instead, he falls back on the idea that Congress
could not be expected to specify terms such as interest rates because
these terms were "inherently unknowable in advance" and because
"negotiation would be key" to their determination. 4 72 The First
Congress's act authorizing the President to borrow up to $12 million
was generally silent on interest rates and required only that terms
on a large subset of loans "paying off the whole of the said foreign
debt" be "advantageous." 473 While Congress had some notion of the
interest rate that the President would be required to accept when
taking out a loan, 474 the precise interest rate was difficult and
perhaps impossible to predict in legislation. But this type of
unpredictability goes to necessity, which is quite different from the
importance of questions delegated. As explained above, if the
President borrowed $12 million at a rate of 5% instead of 4%, he

would contractually obligate the United States to increase its
annual interest payments by $12.86 billion in today's dollars. 475
This does not even account for the President's discretion over other
terms, namely commission fees, which would also represent 3.5% to
Wurman, supra note 12, at 1549.
See supranotes 380-392 and accompanying text (discussing the interference proceeding
and results); Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, §§ 5-6, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1836) (establishing
a first-to-invent test for judicial proceedings).
471 Wurman, supra note 12, at 1490.
472 Id. at 1545.
47 Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 2, 1 Stat. 138, 139.
474 See, e.g., HAMILTON, supra note 20 (predicting 4% to 5% interest rates to Congress).
47 See supra notes 251-52.
469

470
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9% of the total amount borrowed. 4 76 The President's significant
discretion over borrowing terms undoubtedly qualified as important
based on its "vast 'economic and political significance"'
"overall impact on the economy."478

477

and

It is difficult to grasp why the "unknowable" nature of borrowing
terms should prevent debt legislation from counting as evidence
that the First Congress delegated important policy questions. The
major questions canon of statutory interpretation provides the

opposite: unknowable yet important terms cannot be delegated by
an open-ended statute. This canon requires Congress to provide
clear statutory authorization before an agency can claim "to
discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate 'a
significant portion of the American economy."' 479 Major questions
cases frequently turn on matters that are unknowable in advance.
For example, the Congress that enacted the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act did not know that harmful "drugs" would someday
include tobacco products, 480 and the Congress that passed relevant
amendments to the Clean Air Act did not know that "air pollutants"
would someday include greenhouse gases. 481 Therefore, the fact that
the First Congress delegated important and inherently unknowable
determinations of interest rates counts as originalist evidence
against arguments that the major subjects canon of statutory
interpretation (or something similar) should extend to a
constitutional nondelegation doctrine.

476 Riley, supra note 244, at 659 tbl.1 (listing commission fees on Dutch loans to the United
States).
477 Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).
478 U.S. Telcom Ass'n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for rehearing en bane).
479 UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159); accord Brown
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160 (reasoning that "Congress could not have intended to delegate"
power to regulate tobacco products, a "decision of such economic and political significance ...
in so cryptic a fashion").
480 Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 146-47 (disclaiming any "evidence" that the enacting
"Congress in 1938 even considered the applicability of the Act to tobacco products").
481 UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (declaring that the EPA's rules "would render the statute
unrecognizable to the Congress that designed' it" (quoting Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,555 (June
3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71))).
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Further, if unknowability is the test (or excuses the requirement
that Congress decide important questions), then there is no need for
the Court to revamp the nondelegation doctrine that it has been
applying for over eighty years.

Delegations

that satisfy the

intelligible principle requirement routinely hand off matters
unknowable in advance, especially in the context of the dynamic and
expert determinations that pervade the administrative state. 482 One
need only consider Justice Scalia's approval of capacious Clean Air
Act provisions in American Trucking.483 The Clean Air Act directed
the EPA to set "uniform national standards" 484 for air quality by
establishing pollutant levels "requisite to protect the public
health"485 and required "[a]ir quality criteria" to "reflect the latest
scientific

knowledge."486

This

language

authorized

"sweeping

regulatory schemes" and empowered the EPA to set "air standards
that affect the entire national economy." 487 It reflected Congress's
delegation of authority to resolve unknowable matters, such as
dynamic regulatory policies in which public health protections
would turn on "the latest scientific knowledge." 488 If the important
questions test is flexible enough to accommodate the delegations
authorized in early borrowing legislation and approved in American
Trucking, then it is no different than the intelligible principle
requirement that the Court has been applying all along. There is no
need to abandon precedent to accommodate such a malleable test.
VI. CONCLUSION

For some jurists, the search for historical evidence of a robust
nondelegation doctrine has become a modern-day quest for the Holy
Grail. If only originalist evidence of this nondelegation doctrine
could be found, it would breathe new life into a doctrine that is "not

See Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 287, at 6 (discussing agencies' role in effectuating
the "dynamic expert determinations mandated by Congress").
483 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
482

484

Id.

at 473.

Id. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
486 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2).
487
American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475.
488 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2).
485
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dead yet!"4 8 9 Justice Gorsuch and like-minded members of the
Supreme Court would be free to "rediscover"490 an over 200-year-old
principle that has been forgotten in recent decades. But sometimes
a lack of historical evidence does not mean that something is, like
the Holy Grail, a relic that is merely difficult to find. Instead, it may
mean that the object one is seeking never existed-or at least that
"plausible" evidence of its existence fails to establish dissonance
between governing precedent and understandings of the
Constitution that prevailed at the Founding.
The historical evidence unearthed in this Article shows that
there is no occasion to abandon precedent, as a more
accommodating nondelegation doctrine has been with us from the
start. Members of the First Congress considered constitutional
objections to the delegation of legislative powers. They debated both
whether and at what point Congress could hand off enumerated
legislative powers to the Executive Branch. The constitutional line
drawn in these initial congressional debates and resulting
legislation had nothing to do with the importance of the subjects to
be delegated. In fact, the First Congress exceeded this line time and
again by delegating important questions in debt and patent

legislation.
The line recognized by early Congresses may not have been exact,
but it never clearly aligned with the more rigorous tests that some
originalists call for today. The overall historical record of legislation
passed by early Congresses is one of broad delegation to decide
important questions. Originalists looking for a more aggressive

alternative to the intelligible principle requirement have embarked
on a futile quest. The Founding Era does not provide the answer
they seek.

HAMBURGER, supra note 4, at 377-78 (noting that "critics of administrative law often"
defend their position with this line from a well-known "Monty Python skit").
490 Lawson, supra note 12, at 9 ("In sum, the Supreme Court does not need to create a nonsubdelegation doctrine. It needs only to rediscover it.").
489
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